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PREFACE 
This paper originated in a short exploratory piece of work for the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in the nature of a "strategic recon- 
naissance" of a complex knot of environmental-social problems. However, 
early forays indicated strong underlying parallels with issues being explored 
in other case studies in the  Institutional Settings and Environmental Policies 
(INS) project a t  IlASk For this reason, and despite its limited external 
resources, the Himalaya work written up here took its place as one part of a 
troika INS project. tha t  also involved research on hazardous waste manage- 
ment and on energy policy modeling. 
Though the main effort has been on hazardous waste management, the 
intellectual connections between these apparently diverse research fields 
have proved most instructive. These connections have to  do with the ways in 
which uncertainties (both technical and social) are defined by institutions. 
especially regulatory and policy analytic bodies. The thrust  of research on all 
these fronts has been to better  characterise different kinds of uncertainty and 
to explore the origins and policy implications of conflicting problem defini- 
tions. The practical aim in this effort has been to encourage better policy 
design. An understanding of the institutional roots of uncertainty and of mul- 
tiple problem definitions opens the way for an anticipatory style of policy for- 
mulation that is capable of evaluating the implementability, and thus viabil- 
ity, of different policy options and institutional arrangements. This strategic 
concern is a direct evolution from the previous work of the Risk Group--the 
predecessor to INS. 
In presenting this work, and as INS Research Leader, I cannot let pass the 
opportunity of expressing my deep personal appreciation for the enthusiasm, 
commitment and all-round support shown by Mike Warburton as a research 
colleague in the group. He is much missed. 
Brian Wynne 
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KNOWING WHERE TO HIT IT: 
A CONCXPTUAL F'RAMEWORK FOR THE 
SUSMINABLE DEXEZOPMENT OF THE -YAS 
Michael Thompson and Michael Warburton 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Rapidly increasing populations of small-scale agriculturalists-people who 
depend directly on the land for their living--may be threatening the  entire 
ecology of the Himalayan region. But the deforestation and the associated 
massive erosion and flooding are not merely technical problems. Beneath 
them lie millions of people and a multiplicity of social, political and economic 
processes, perspectives, expectations and ambitions. There can be no doubt 
that, if there is a problem. i t  is first and foremost a human problem. 
Nor is the  Himalayan system a closed system. A t  all levels it connects 
into the wider global system. The jet stream's complex interaction with the 
Greater Himalayan Range is believed to be crucial to the annual onset and ter- 
mination of the monsoon throughout the Indian sub-continent; the silt-laden 
run-off frorn thousands of mountain torrents alternately devastates and nour- 
ishes the Indo-Gangetic Plain and the great deltas that. over the millennia, it 
has itself created. What happens in the Himalayas is, quite literally, vital to 
the 350 million people who live in the plains beneath them; and. farther afield 
still, millions more, keenly aware that  we have only one Himalayas to lose, 
mobilize a t  every level frorn the  United Nations to the  individual to  do what 
they can to avert that tragic loss. 
The largely frustrating history of attempts to do the "right" thing has left 
some valuable lessons in its wake, but a great deal remains to be learned. 
Many meticulously planned projects have turned out to be totally inappropri- 
ate, and even counterproductive, when measured against their stated goals. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has therefore asked 
IIASA, first, to try to analyse this complex Himalayan system and, second, to 
try to draw some strategic recommendations from that  analysis.* 
The prospect of death, Dr. Johnson said, concentrates the mind wonder- 
fully, and a ten-week deadline has much the same effect. We decided, first, to  
choose an approach that  might allow us to say something useful in the very 
short time-span available to us and. second. to try not to say anything that  
had already been well said. This Working Paper is a revised version of the draft 
paper, hLterrelationships Between Resources, E'nvironment. People and 
DeveLopment: ?he Case of the Himulayan Fbothills, that we submitted to  UNEP 
on Christmas Eve 1982. The first section, Appropriate h.stitutional Develop- 
ment,  is essentially the  Discussion Paper that we provided for the Inter-Agency 
Meeting, sponsored by UNEP, that  took place in Geneva on 15 and 16 August 
1983. The second section, Uncertainty on a Himalayan Scale, as well as pro- 
viding the technical and reasoned support for the argument we advanced in 
our Discussion Paper, has been developed as part of IIASA's continuing con- 
cern with uncertainty and institutions. 
A final qualification is to h o w  our limitations. We a t  IlASA were not 
prepared, nor did we attempt, to design a specific plan of action for UNEP after 
only a brief survey study (a study which, moreover, left us no time to learn 
about UNEP as an institution and about the context in which i t  has to 
operate). Rather, we have directed what expertise we have towards outlining a 
potentially useful perspective on a problem that has  challenged technical 
experts from many disciplines for many years. With the help of an 
advisory/working group composed of several key experts on the region*., we 
have produced a conceptual framework for handling both the technical and 
the human problems. Though our study suffers from some of the defects asso- 
ciated with time-pressured work (and has not yet had the  benefit of being 
tested in up-to-date conversations with practitioners in the field), this frame- 
work reveals a set  of strategic insights which may help international agencies 
(and others) to  shape more effective policies for the encouragement of 
environmentally sound development in the region. The perspective and 
revealed insights are  intended to provoke productive discussion among people 
better acquainted than ourselves with the difficulties encountered in imple- 
menting international programmes. 
The starting point for our analysis has been the recognition that  man 
does not interact directly with his environment. I t  is not just perception but 
cognition-seeing and knowing--that brings man and his environment together 
and, since there is more than one way of knowing, there is more than one way 
for him to come to  grips with his environment. Since man is a social animal 
*See Appendix A. 
**See Appendix B. a 
and since knowledge is a social product, the relation between him and his 
environment is inevitably threaded through a more or less well integrated 
buffer of social and cultural institutions-institutions that run the whole 
gamut from the Charter of the United Nations to the Sherpa habit of not men- 
tioning the names of the  dead. The analysis, therefore, suggests that ,  if i t  is 
possible to unlock the downward spiral of environmental degradation and 
unsustainable patterns of development, the key ~111 be found within these 
myriad institutions. 
Most attempts to intervene in this downward spiral are founded on the  
assumption that  the forest is a renewable resource that must be conserved. 
But to apply this assumption where all the institutional supports are lent to  
the contrary assumption--that the forest is a convertible resource-is to invite 
a truly uphill struggle. All the institutions will have to be turned around 
before such a project can have any lasting effect. Perceptual mismatches 
such as this abound in the Himalayas and they present formidable obstacles to 
the implementation of policies that take no account of them. In this study. we 
try to  develop criteria to judge what actions might or might not be appropri- 
ate in certain contexts. And, in the process, we reject the "grand design" 
approach t o  development. 
To think in terms of "Development with a capital D" when confronted by 
such a veritable patchwork of institutional heterogeneity, to speak of an 
"integrated approach to environmental management and development plan- 
ning" when confronted by such a diversity of resource perceptions, and to  call 
for policies to be considered in "the global framework of the interrelated 
phenomena of a planned process of development", when the only frameworks 
that could tell you anything about the  likely efficacy of a policy are  those at  
the most local level, is, we argue, to  invite disaster. These ideas which are 
appealing a t  the macro level-the international agencies and the  national 
governments of the region--must first be related to the institutional reality on 
the local level, and action taken only when this is understood. 
For example, the Appropriate Technology solutions of fuel-efficient stoves 
and solar cookers to combat deforestation are  environmentally appropriate 
only if the forest is being viewed as a renewable r e s o u r c e 4  perception to 
which, as i t  so happens, the  providers of that  technology are deeply attached. 
But what if those to whom they wish to deliver this technology see the forest 
not as a source of fuel but as a source of fresh agricultural land (and our 
analysis suggests that  this is often, but not always, the case in the 
Himalayas)? Give them the technology and the last obstacle to the full clear- 
ance of the  forest is removed. As we go from one institutionally induced per- 
ception to another, so the Appropriate Technology becomes supremely inap- 
propriate. 
In contrast to  this "grand design" approach. the alternative that  emerges 
from our analysis seeks to retain and respect all these different perceptions 
by untangling some strands of the web of interrelationships that  supports 
them. The result is a set of strategic recommendations that  are designed to 
do two things. First, to  help UNEP to remove itself from criticism for taking 
inappropriate actions and, second. to provide UNEP with an evaluative frame- 
work that  will help i t  to channel its effort in potentially effective directions. 
To be more specific, our analysis suggests that  much can be learned from 
interacting with institutions as they now exist and from monitoring the 
momentum of the particular processes that  have led to the present institu- 
tional configurations. ,The interrelated concepts of political development. 
economic development. and institutional development begin to  suggest 
context-specific criteria for distinguishing appropriate actions and technolo- 
gies from inappropriate ones. 
For example, i t  is often suggested tha t  Switzerland faced the  same prob- 
lem in 1880 that Nepal faces today: serious deforestation and associated mas- 
sive erosion and flooding. The Swiss solution was a strict forestry law that  
tightly regulated the cutting of timber. The serious suggestions made by 
those who draw this parallel is tha t  such a law (with, of course, appropriate 
cultural adaptations) could form the  basis for a solution in the  Himalayas. 
Beyond the  fact that  the technical problem is essentially quite different in a 
monsoon-dominated climate, the  institutional situation of Nepal today, with 
regard to economic and political development, is quite different from that  of 
Switzerland in 1880. A str ict  law enacted by central authority could not possi- 
bly have the same effect, or even the  same meaning, in Nepal now that  i t  had 
in Switzerland then. 
There is indeed a great  deal tha t  must  be learned before suggested revi- 
sions in (let alone transplants of) institutional structures can be meaningful. 
A sensitivity to  local contexts and their  histories is the first essential. The 
appropriate institutional development approach suggests that  large-scale pro- 
jects which attempt to solve problems defined on a regional scale often cross 
too many contextual boundaries to  even be considered appropriate, and can 
sometimes be positively counter-productive if pushed through without revi- 
sion. Our analysis begins to  offer some criteria for evaluating these contexts 
and their  tremendous local variation. But we also try to show that,  whilst the 
notion of institutional appropriateness closes certain options (such as the  
Swiss solution), i t  does a t  the same time open up many others tha t  remain 
hidden to  the single problem/single solution approach. These hidden options 
are revealed by taking the contrary approach--the multiple problem/multiple 
solution approach. 
In surveying the extensive data available on "the problem" in the  
Himalayas, we were immediately struck by the remarkable range of expert 
opinion on a number of key variables. For example, the  high and low esti- 
mates of annual per capita fuelwood consumption in Nepal differ by a factor 
(not a percentage!) of 67. Whether the  subject of enquiry is tuelwood use, agri- 
cultural production, or even whether there is a connection between deforesta- 
tion and flooding, the  collection of valid and non-contradictory data is extraor- 
dinarily difficult. 
The available data, in other words. do not suggest a single credible and 
generally consistent picture of what is happening in the Himalayas. Such a 
picture can be obtained only by arbitrarily declaring some of tha t  data to be 
anomalous. Our approach, in essence, i s  defined, first, by our unwillingness to 
do this and, second, by the mild and unremarkable observation tha t  the scien- 
tist in the  Himalayan region is continually finding that it is institutional 
forces tha t  muddle his at tempts t,o analyse and solve what, a t  first glance, 
appear t o  be technical problems. In many ways, it seems to us, the  institu- 
tions me t he  facts. 
We therefore have chosen to t ry to understand the  man-land interactions 
in the Himalayas through the institutions and the  perceptions that go along 
with those interactions. The tremendous variation encountered in all 
contexts--physical and institutional-is itself a key attribute of the system. 
Recognition of this pervasive heterogeneity immediately makes approaches 
based on a homogeneous understanding of "the problem" inappropriate for the  
Himalayan region. 
In the single-problem/single-solution approach the  institutional reality a t  
the local level--the seething mass of contradictory problem definitions, con- 
tending perceptions, divergent personal strategies and polarised policy 
prescriptions-is inevitably part  O F  the problem. If the problem and its solu- 
tion have already been defined then successful implementation calls for the  
imposition of the  correct perception and the  eradication of all the mispercep- 
tions. Inevitably i t  calls for the hegemony of a single personal strategy (the 
one that  will respond to policy in the expected way), and for the  de- 
legitimation of those who, for the  best of institutional reasons, advocate 
prescriptions tha t  run  counter to  the official diagnosis. 
But, in the multiple-problem/multiple-solution approach, this plurality 
becomes part of the  solution. The contradictions and the  contentions--the 
heterogeneity a t  every level--constitute a rich resource, perhaps the ultimate 
resource. Implementation no longer requires us to insist ' that one set  of pol- 
icy actors is right and that all the  others are  wrong. Instead, our attention is 
directed towards the  notion of appropriateness; which kinds of social transac- 
tions are best handled by which institutional mode? How can we ac t  a t  the  
macro level in such a way a s  to  encourage multiply defined solutions to 
emerge a t  the local level and there meet  up constructively with plurally per- 
ceived problems? 
These are the  sorts of questions we pose, and attempt to answer, in this 
paper. 
CHAPTER 2. APPROPRIATE INSIITLJTIONAL DEYELOPhENT: 
AN ARROGANT ARGUMENT FOR A HUMBLE APPROACH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For centuries the Khumbu Sherpas managed their common forest 
resources with the help of their social institution of forest guardian (naua) - a 
rotating office within each village the annual holder of which, after due (but 
fairly casual) consultation, laid down the permissible extraction rates for fuel- 
wood and constructional timber and exacted traditional fines on those vil- 
lagers who did not comply [Fiirer-Haimendorf 1964 and 19751. But. following 
the overthrow of the Rana regime in Kathmandu in the 1950's. all the forests 
in Nepal were nationalised and control vested in regionally-based officials. 
Since the Sherpa who wanted to cut a tree for a new roof-post now had to go on 
a four-day walk to  Paphlu (the local administrative centre) to  obtain permis- 
sion, instead of just popping round the corner to a fellow villager's house, and, 
since the official in Paphlu could not see what was happening in Khumbu (and 
in a hundred similar forests), the old institution was destroyed and the ned 
one simply did not work. 
This little example, by showing the way in which institutions a t  different 
organisational levels can impinge on one another, helps to clarify the idea of 
context. Before the  nationalisation of forests, the  administrative institutions 
in Kathmandu were not part of the institutional context of forest management 
in Khumbu; after the nationalisation they were. Since the micro-institution- 
the system of village-based forest guardians-worked quite well, whilst the 
macro-institution-the nationalised forest system-simply destroyed the  
micro-institution and then did not work itself, we can use the twin notions of 
institition and context to distinguish between those institutional arrange- 
ments that are appropriate and those that  are not. That, in essence, is what 
we t ry  to do in this chapter. 
INSTflUTIONS AND THE ENJTRONMENT 
But this approach, by way of institutions and contexts, is only a begin- 
ning. Though i t  provides us with our conceptual framework, we still have to 
bring that framework down to earth. And i t  is the  earth-the precarious 
rcsource base for all these institutions and contexts-that is our prime con- 
cern. What is happening to  it and what, if anything. can those who are  caught 
up in all these institutions (and that  includes us) do about it? Since the parts 
of the Himalayan resource base that  are  causing the most alarm are those 
parts that are communally exploited, the  whole inquiry has ended up being 
concentrated on the  tragedy of the c o m m o n s .  
There is a tendency, especially among those who care most vociferously 
about the world's natural resources, to interpret environmental degradation 
in general, and Himalayan deforestation in particular, in uncompromisingly 
tragic terms-something quite awful is befalling us,  and it is we who have 
unleashed the  inexorable forces that lie behind it. The trees disappear, they 
argue, because no one individual can afford to do what he would do if only 
everyone else would do the same. Unable to take this first step from selfish- 
ness to altruism, we end up destroying the one world that  should be our most 
sacred trust in a frenzy of myopic greed 
We bring our approach down to earth by questioning this interpretation. 
I t  is not the tragedy itself-the environmental degradation--that we query. 
That, we concede, happens often enough. It is the inezorableness of the  forces 
that shape the tragedy, and our powerlessness in the face of them, tha t  we 
take issue with. As the example of the Sherpa forest-guardians shows, even 
the flimsiest and most casual of institutional' arrangements can avert the  
tragedy. Tragedies happen, not because they are inherent in the commons, 
but because the institutional supports for the  commons are insufficient or 
inappropriate. 
Of course, if every appropriate institutional support was already in place, 
if every one of them was already giving its maximum possible support, and if 
every instance of contention between these institutions had already adjusted 
itself to the Pareto optimum,* then there would be nothing that  we could do, 
except keep our fingers crossed and watch to see whether the great tragedy 
hit us or passed us by. But this is not how things are in the Himalayas. The 
institutions. as they now stand, are not giving of their best; there is room for 
improvement. The problem is to h o w  what can be changed (and what cannot 
be prevented from changing) and to  know whether such changes would be 
improvements. 
Institutions are all tha t  we have to work with and, like it or not, we must 
work with the  institutions that  we have. These institutions, fortunately, are 
not immutable; they can be changed and they do change. But, as the example 
of the Khumbu forests makes clear, not every institutional change is a step in 
the direction of environmental sustainability. The challenge is threefold and 
formidable: to identify the  feasible (or inevitable) institutional changes, to 
gain some feel for whether they are likely to promote or demote environmen- 
tal sustainability, and to understand the extent to which it may be possible to 
intervene so as to encourage the  desirable changes and to discourage t h e  
undesirable changes. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLiTICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The lessons of the Khumbu forest have not gone unheeded All the  signs 
are that  control of such forests is now beginning to be devolved back to t h e  
local level. Social forestry projects in Nepal and grassroots pressures, such as 
the Chipko Movement in India, are helping to bring this about. So it might 
appear tha t  after thirty years we have come full circle, with the  original insti- 
tutional supports back where they were but with many of the forests having 
disappeared in the process. But this back-to-where-we-were interpretation 
ignores the very considerable political development tha t  has taken place dur- 
ing this time. In 1950 the  administrative institutions in Kathmandu scarcely 
*fie point beyond wnich any change makes one, other or both parties worse off than they were b e  
fare. 
touched the daily lives of the Sherpas in Khumbu; now they touch them in 
many ways. The Royal Nepalese Airlines Corporation flies regularly into Lukla 
and Sangboche, the Edmund Hillary schools (started in the 1960's) have been 
incorporated into the national education system, a police station a t  Namche 
stamps the  trekking permits of the  thousands of tourists who pass through the  
area every year, and many Sherpas now divide their time between their farms 
in Khumbu and their burgeoning business interests in Kathmandu. 
So it is not simply a matter  of the  government increasing the  centraliza- 
tion of its power in 1950 and preparing t o  decentralize it now. Over the last 
thirty years there has been an enormous increase in the  total amount of 
power in the  system and, even when i t  has devolved the control of the  forests 
back t o  the local level, the government's power will still be immeasurably 
more centralized than it  was when it  saw fit to nationalize the forests. 
The relationship between economic development and political develop 
ment  is not (to say the least) entirely clear, nor is i t  altogether free from con- 
troversy, but that  there i s  a relationship and tha t  it  is an important relation- 
ship is  somewhat less disputable. The point we wish t o  make is simply that  t h e  
undoubted economic development tha t  has occurred in the Khumbu region is 
consistent with the thesis tha t  political development is a necessary condition 
for sustainable economic development, and that  the decentralization of power 
is conducive to  political development only after the total amount of power 
within the  system has been very considerably increased [Boggs 19821. One 
advantage of seeing both economic and political development in t e rms  of 
institutional development is  that  i t  allows one to  take some useful account of 
these sorts of necessary conditions and to make some sort of useful institu- 
tional assessment of just where and when decentralization (or centralization) 
is likely to be effective--politically, economically and environmentally. 
So the  approach we are  advocating is an approach by way of institutions. 
Since the  institutions (in the  Himalayan region a t  any rate) a re  so  richly 
heterogeneous, their  development is not amenable to "grand design" solu- 
tions. Rather, the  process of institutional development is inherently unplann- 
able. But it  does, a t  certain places and a t  certain times, offer points of 
leverage-localized opportunities for facilitating and integrating the  develop 
ment  of institutions in the desired direction. Since such an approach has all 
the t ime to be sensitive to  contexts, so as t o  be able to recognize a point of 
ieverage when i t  sees one, we could perhaps speak of this approach as 
appopri.de institutional deve Lopment . 
TRANSACTIONS AND BO UNDARlES 
The actions of international agencies in the  Himalayan region affect the  
lives of many people. These actions are primarily concerned with the  transfer 
of various resources from the  outside to  the inside of the  region, and the  great  
challenge lies not in doing this--that is easy enough--but in doing it  in such a 
way as to  assure and strengthen the  environmental sustainability of the  
development processes tha t  those resources will meet  up with once they a re  
inside the  region. The crucial question in the  approach we label appropriate 
institutional development is: "1s there  anything we on the outside can do tha t  
will make the  forests (or whatever) more valuable to those on the  inside whose 
activities, directly or indirectly, impinge upon those resources?". 
Take, for instance, those Himalayan creatures currently assigned to the 
category "animals of no economic valueH-tigers, pheasants, rhinoceroses, 
langur monkeys, red pandas, snow leopards, and so on. I t  is true that, in a 
narrow economic sense, these animals have no value-they are not exploitable 
through domestication in the way that goats and water buffalo and yaks and 
domestic fowl are--but, to many people far-removed from the Himalayan 
region, they have immense biological value*. Their argument is that we (by 
which they mean humankind) would be immeasurably impoverished if we were 
to allow these species to be driven into extinction. One of the great practical 
challenges for the practitioner of appropriate institutional development is to 
facilitate and integrate the long chain of institutional links that will 
transmute the biological values ,of individuals many thousands of miles 
removed from the Himalayas into the economic values of those who actually 
live there. I t  is not an impossible task and, indeed, many of the necessary 
institutional supports are already in place. 
Each of these "animals of no economic value" has, organized around it, an 
articulate and potentially highly effective group of humans dedicated to its 
conservation and welfare. Those individuals in the West who are concerned for 
the pheasants of the  Himalayan region are not just interested in pheasants- 
they are fandical about t h e m a n d  the same is true for all the other human 
groups that  are focused on these "worthless" animals. They will, and do, travel 
thousands of miles in the hope of seeing their chosen creatures and they will, 
and do, spend thousands of dollars, pounds, marks, yen, francs, and lira in the 
process. As long as the animals and their habitats are there, they and their 
money will pour into the Himalayas and, if the  animals and their habitats go, 
then that  money will stop. Once this connection is made, it is clearly non- 
sense to speak of these fabulous (and inalienable) assets as "animals of no 
economic value". 
The problem, in many ways, is quite trivial. Those who want to  keep the 
forests and their biological riches in place are willing and able to  pay the 
price, and those who are currently removing the forests would be only too 
happy to be paid not to. Only connect--that is the task of appropriate institu- 
tional development. 
*Norman Myers, one of the eb!est proponents of this position, describes the world's tropical forests 
er "over-exploited and under-utilized". He argues that protecting them from rampant deforesta- 
tion should be a high priority for Third World governments and international arganizations, b e  
cause of the biological treasures the foresta hold. "Their tremendous diversity has not been exam- 
ined. Tropical forests cover less than seven percent of the earth's surface, but contain. fifty per- 
cent d its specied'. ( A s  reported by Rob& Smgeorge, Washngton, 3 May 1863, UPL) 
The literature, we have found, tends to segregate itself into three quite 
distinct levels-the bio-physical, the micro-social, and the macro-social. The 
phenomena a t  each of these levels can readily be represented in a systemic 
way and each of these levels tends to be appropriated by a particular set of 
disciplines. We should stress that these are ep i s t emo log i ca l  levels--partial 
discontinuities in the arrangement of knowledge. We do not claim that the 
world itself is so arranged But, since it is systems of knowledge that allow us 
to understand and (to some extent) to manage the world. we draw upon these 
three levels and their systemic connections for our conceptual framework. 
?he Bio-Physical Level 
The physical and biological scientists [Reiger 1981, for instance, and 
Pereira 19811 focus on the physical and natural processes that sustain (and, 
under certain conditions, undermine) the forests until eventually they bump 
up  against the agents that are busy removing the trees-the individual hill 
farmers. These agents, clearly, are a crucial part of the system but the 
natural scientist is, by now, getting away from his expertise and he tends to 
represent the behaviour of the farmer by some rather simple set  of assump- 
tions based'on the "tragedy of the commons" hypothesis. 
?he Micro-Socid Level 
The anthropologists, the social foresters, and the cultural geographers 
focus on the individual hill farmer and his social context-the framework of 
land tenure within the village and the patterns of social relationships within 
the village. The rather inadequate figure sketched by the natural scientists is 
here worked up into a very full and accurate portrait. We get right into the 
worlds of the Gurung [MacFariane 1976, Messerschmidt 19761, the Sherpa 
[FGrer-Haimendorf 1964, Ortner 19781, the Rai [Allen 19721, and so on and we 
begin to  see their physical and social environments in their terms. In particu- 
lar, the  ethno-ecological studies of Kirsten Johnson and her  colleagues [1982] 
reveal to us the hill farmer's own land-use categories and, through them, the 
shrewd, sensitive and rational strategies by which he strives t o  manage the 
natural and man-made hazards that he faces. 
Furer-Hairnendorf [1975] goes one stage further and broadens this picture 
by moving back and forth between the Hindu and Buddhist populations- 
between the Middle Ranges and the Highlands-and thereby revealing the very 
different, yet mutually reinforcing, strategies of the "cautious cultivator" (for 
whom land is wealth) and the "adventurous trader" (for whom individualized 
exchange is wealth). This painstaking teasing out of the various socially 
induced strategies that are available at  the micro-level opens up all sorts of 
policy capabilities that  are ignored (denied, even) by the tragedy-of-the- 
commans assumptions.* But what is absolutely crucial before we can hope to 
exercise these capabilities is an understanding of the sorts of perturbations to 
an individual's social context that will dislodge him from one strategy and 
bring him to rest a t  another. There are, of course; perturbations a t  this 
micro-level but they pale into insignificance against the sorts of perturbations 
that are generated a t  the macro-level: 
*And also, re would argue, by the assumptions built into "economic man" 
e.g., rapidly rising population, 
industrial development, 
geo-political upheavals, 
policy changes a t  central government level. 
'Ihe Macro- Social Level 
The political scientists, the policy analysts, and the students of interna- 
tional relations focus almost exclusively on this macro-social level, often to 
impressive effect. For instance, a serious trans-boundary problem in North 
America and Europe is  acid rain. There, as in the  Himalayas, something that  
happens in one country is seen as having unfortunate downstream conse- 
quences in another country. The physical scientists do their research, the 
ministerial level meetings are held, resolutions are passed, and eventually, 
mutually satisfactory national policies are thrashed out. When it comes to the 
implementation of those policies the  obstacles, though considerable, are not 
insuperable. The agents that  cause the acid rain are  the power stations con- 
trolled by vast utilities or even vaster nationalized industries. Legislation. 
regulation and inspection are quite easily applied to  such agents. once the 
political will has been mustered. But, in the Himalayas, the agents are the 
myriad individual hill farmers. So i t  is a prob lem of m a n y  rzgents, and satis- 
factory policy formulation and implementation simply will not be possible 
unless the micro and macro levels are first related to  one another. 
A S m p l i s t i c  Model 
The understanding of the systems that  operate a t  each of these three 
levels-the the bio-physical, the micro-social, and the macro-social is  really 
most impressive (in qualitative terms, at  least). The understanding of the sys- 
temic connections between these three levels is abysmal--.on-existent 
almost*. But it is precisely these connections-between the  natural environ- 
ment, the myriad strategizing agents, and the large-scale social 
perturbations-that will have to be explored and understood before we can 
really tell whether anything can be done about the environmental degradation 
of the Himalayas and, if so, what. 
What we have tried to do with this little study is to construct some sort of 
framework for these connections, and to construct it in such a way that  the 
crucial insights that  already exist a t  the different levels are preserved and. 
indeed, are given salience. Insights such as that  the tragedy is not intrinsic to 
the commons but, rather, results from a lack of appropriate institutional s u p  
port. Insights such as that  the "cautious cultivator" and "adventurous trader" 
strategies are induced and stabilized by social context rather than by cultural 
heritage. Insights such as that the foreign policy of a buffer state is best 
served by it playing off one international agency against another rather than 
by encouraging them to negotiate an integrated effort. 
*The one disciplinary exception being the forest historian. 
INSIGHTS AND SYSTEMIC CONNECTIONS 1: 
THE TRAGEDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALLY UNSUPPORTED COMMONS 
The prevalent thesis that  the tragedy is inherent to the commons and 
that,  human nature being what i t  is, the tragedy is therefore unavoidable, 
leads directly to some drastic conclusions. Either we must get rid of the com- 
mons or we must change human nature. The first conclusion justifies privati- 
zation as the only viable policy; the second conclusion, pinning its hope on a 
new era  of human cooperation being miraculously ushered in through the 
application of draconian regulation, justifies coercive utopianism as the only 
viable policy. Rieger [1981]. for example, and Wallace [1983] find themselves 
carried towards the privatization policy; Hardin, [1968] for example, and Cro- 
nin [1979] find themselves carried towards the coercive utopianism policy. 
Those milder observers, who happen not to be already predisposed towards one 
or other of these extreme solutions, will point out that those who subscribe to 
this bleak view of humankind have simply failed to apprehend the  full wonder 
of human social and cultural institutions. 
The whole historical process that  is subsumed within the rubric of "sus- 
tained institutional developmentw-whether i t  be the successful operation of 
the Sherpa system of forest guardians in Nepal or the emergence in the West 
of professions with codes of practice and associated sanctions capable of 
discouraging those actions that, though profitable to  the individual practi- 
tioner, would bring the calling itself into disreputedan be read as a cumula- 
tive sequence in which commons managing institutions are continuously 
being piled upon commons managing institutions. On this reading, human 
social life is, in large measure, an enterprise in tragedy aversion; and human 
history is, in large measure, the  story of that enterprise's successes and set- 
backs. But the privatizers and the coercive utopians do not read i t  in this way; 
i t  does not square with their predelictions. Their perceptions are  not false; 
they are  partial, partisan, provincial and polarised. 
On top of this, the myth of modernization-the conviction that  we in the 
developed North are  altogether different from them in the developing South- 
has curiously distorted the  dispute between these two schools of tragic 
thought. Because of this we have first to straighten out the distortion before 
we can draw the correct conclusions from the dispute. The privatizers and the ' 
coercive utopians share the same basic assumption--that the  tragedy is 
intrinsic to the c o m m o n s d u t  they s tar t  off from seriously polarized positions 
on development. The privatizers are  f o r  development, the coercive utopians 
are against it (it is this polarization that  shapes the growth/no growth -debate 
in the  North). Both subscribe to the myth of modernization and see us as alto- 
gether diIferent from them; i t  is just that the privatizer sees development as a 
desideratum and the coercive utopian sees it as a disaster. Both are suffused 
with missionary zeal (though, in this secular age, such zeal tends to take on 
an economic or ecological form). The privatizer sees the unmoderns as 
benighted (underdeveloped) heathens and is anxious to lighten their  darkness; 
the coercive utopian sees them as noble (nature-respecting) savages and is 
anxious to bring us Gadarene swine to our senses before we all fall over the 
eco-cliff edge. 
When the milder observers enter  onto this polarized scene. and point out 
that  in many traditional societies there exist all sorts of institutions for the 
collective management of resources, the myth of modernization immediately 
insinuates itself to insist that  such archaic institutions do not, of course, exist 
among us moderns. As the milder observers then move on to become advo- 
cates for the adoption and adaptation of these traditional commons managing 
institutions into the development process so they accuse the privatizers of 
seeking to impose their inappropriate Northern solutions upon the South. And 
so the myth of modernization, remounted, rides on; they are collectivized, we 
are privatized. 
Appropriate institutional development, therefore, faces a twofold task. 
First, it has to show that  the tragedy of the commons is not intrinsic to the 
commons themselves but is a consequence of their receiving insufficient or 
inappropriate institutional support; second, it  has to  show that  we in the 
developed North are as knee-deep in collective commons managing institu- 
tions as are they in the developing South (and that it  is only the different 
stages that  each has currently reached in the development process that  in 
any way distinguishes them). Of course, it is to the professions and to the 
self-regulation of institutions such as stock exchanges and Lloyds of London 
that we should be looking in the developed North but. even so, we can still find 
examples of Northern agricultural commons managing institutions. 
The Solway Marshes in the north of England, for instance, are a common 
that is managed by a combination of privately owned "stints" (grazing rights) 
and the collective control of grazing level through a venerable local body that  
each year assesses the ecological status of the common and sets the number 
OF cattle, sheep, etc. per stint accordingly. Compare this with the forest a t  
Dahbaley in the Arun Valley in Nepal. 
By mutual agreement everyone in the village shared the 
right to  use the  forest as they needed, but no one was 
allowed to clear the land. To promote a sustained yield, the 
headmen of the  village assign rights to gather firewood in 
certain areas of each woodlot, and households jealously 
guard their territories; many territories represent tradi- 
tional claims that  date back several generations. Trivial 
uses of wood are discouraged, and when a household needs a 
particularly large tree for a construction project, they must 
pay a sizable sum to the village headmen. The fundamental 
concept of a renewable resource is also recognized, and the 
headmen will sometimes declare a moratorium on cutting if 
a certain plot shows signs of really excessive use that  yill 
soon lead t o  complete exhaustion. [Cronin 1979, pp.75-76] 
So the Solway Marshes and the Dahbaley forest turn out to  be managed in 
amost identical ways (and similar examples can be added from other parts of 
the world-Botswana, for instance) and the common recipe for success seems 
to  include the following ingredients: 
(i) A definite piece of land; a definite group of people. 
(ii) Small in scale (village level institutions). 
(iii) Some privatization (stints, family "territories'.') and face-to-face relation- 
ships for the communal control mechanism.' 
*We are indebted to Malcolm Odell for this list of ingredients for success. Also relevant here are 
'.ra&tional communal working arrangements such as the Sherpa n g d o k  (F'iirer-Haimendorl 1875) 
and the Gurung nogw (Messersc hmidt 1881). 
INSIGHTS AND SYSTEMIC CONNECTIONS 2: 
THE SOCIALLY IND VCED STRATEGIES 
Very little has changed, it  would appear, since Erik Eckholm wrote: 
Land use patterns are an  expression of deep political, 
economic, and cultural s tructure;  they do not  change when 
an ecologist or forester sounds the  alarm tha t  a country is 
losing its resource base. [Eckholm 1976, p. 1671 
Yet, incontestable though this assertion of changelessness may appear, it does 
not square a t  all well with Heraclitus' similarly incontestable (but rather  
longer lived) assertion that  the  only thing tha t  is permanent is change. To 
resolve this paradox we must look a little more closely a t  what is meant by a 
"deep political, economic and cultural structure". 
Such structures. of course, are built up of institutions and they can, in 
general, be wid or fle&le. A rigid structure resists the inevitable change 
that it encounters and, in so doing, increases its own fragility. Though the  
change is not incorporated into the structure,  i t  does not  go away; it  builds up 
outside the structure until i t  reaches the point where its strength exceeds 
that  of the structure itself. A t  this point we get  stmctural  collapse. A flexible 
s tructure absorbs the inevitable change tha t  i t  encounters and, in so doing, 
stimulates its own adaptability. Since the  change is  continuously incor- 
porated into the structure,  i t  cannot build up outside i t  and this means that,  
instead of structural collapse, we get  s t m t u r a l  &ansition. A complex struc- 
ture (such as  we are talking about in the  Himalayas) will contain both rigidify- 
ing and flexing tendencies in some dynamic and, in general, unbalanced pat- 
tern-of contention. 
The classic development approach has been t o  sound the alarm and then, 
confident that  the  country's attention has been gained, t o  tell it what will 
have to be done if it is to  avoid losing its resource base. I t  has not worked. I t  
has not worked because i t  has ignored (as if i t  were some mere detail of imple- 
mentation) the deep political, economic and cultural s tructure that  is, in fact, 
what determines the  country's attention and lack of attention. What is needed 
is a more sensitive approach; an approach that  places the  'mere details'--the 
institutions tha t  constitute this deep structure- a t  the  very centre of the  
stage and relegates to  the  wings the alarm bellringers and their immaculate 
prescriptions. 
There is, we hasten to  add, nothing particularly new about this approach. 
It is, for instance, wholly consistent with the economic arguments set  out  by 
Hirschman [1977] and by Sen [1975], with the  political science arguments set  
out by Dahl and Lindblom 119531 and by Wildavsky and Pressman [1973], and 
with the rural development arguments se t  out by Clark and Johnston [1982]. 
The only novelty we would claim is in our giving this approach a thoroughgo- 
ing and, we hope, useful institutional expression. 
We would agree with Eckholm when he  says tha t  the  "prerequisites of eco- 
logical recovery are  identical to the  tactics of a more general war against 
poverty and hunger" and we would stay with him when he goes on to  say that  
"those concerned with global ecological deterioration and its consequences 
have no choice but  to throw themselves into the  maelstrom that  is the  politics 
of social change" [Eckholm 1976, p. 1671. But where we might. perhaps, differ 
is in the manner of our throwing oursqlves into that  maelstrom. 
The stark simplicity of the poverty and desperation engendered by a 
rapidly growing landbased population is the basis for the deterioration in the 
Himalayan region, but the attempt to move forward-to do something about 
it-is fraught with all the complexity encountered in any anti-poverty cam- 
paign. As the pressures on the land increase so the hill farmer finds himself 
driven to accepting the second, third, or even fourth best alternatives sug- 
gested to him by his traditional strategies [Johnson e t  al. 19821. At the limit, 
he faces an almost total lack of alternatives. In other words, the deep struc- 
ture is becoming ever more rigid and ever more fragile. To find oneself a part 
of such a structure is to find oneself becoming poorer and poorer; that is what 
poverty i s a  sheer lack of options.* But, though this sort of description does 
fit many of the people who live in the  Himalayas, i t  does not fit them all. I t  
does not fit those, like the Thakkalis and Sherpas, who are busy exploiting the 
opportunities presented by tourism and mountaineering; it does not fit 
Tamang villagers on the fringe of the Kathmandu Valley who are now breeding 
buffalo for the hamburger market, portering for expeditions, and pedalling 
tri-shaws in the gaps in between; i t  does not fit, and it never has fitted, those 
largely Buddhist people whose institutions, such as monasticism and 
economic individualism, stem the cause of all this rigidity--the rising popula- 
tion and the equation of land with w e a l t h a t  source. 
Of course, just because these people are following flexible and adaptive 
strategies, it does not automatically follow that  they are doing wonders for 
their physical environments-that is something that can only be determined 
by careful on-the-ground observation and monitoring. No, what is so impor- 
tant about these opportunistic strategies is not what they are doing to the 
environment (though that ,  of course, is important) but that  they are there. If 
rigidity and fragility spells poverty, then anything that promotes flexibility 
and adaptability carries with it the possibility of escape from poverty. 
Let us explain more precisely what we mean by this, since it is the crux of 
our argument and the key to our strategic recommendations. If land and 
wealth are seen as virtually synonomous, and if the population that has to live 
on that  land is increasing rapidly, then we have a negative-sum game from 
which the  only possible relief is by way of population stabilization or increased 
productivity (or both). But, if the equation of land with wealth is severed, clo- 
sure is no longer inevitable and it is possible (but by no means certain) that 
the game will become positive sum. A t  present both games are being played in 
the Himalayas. 
The distinctive feature of mountain environments is not that they are 
relatively closed but, rather, that  they exert severe constraints upon the 
organisation of social life. Some settlements may indeed be constrained in 
such a way as to  be almost totally isolated; elsewhere lines of communication 
may be constrained in such a way that  settlements are little more than stag- 
ing posts for a massive two-way traffic in trade between areas separated by the 
mountains. Thus, a t  one extreme, communities are so constrained that they 
have to be self-supporting (though in the Himalayas such communities are few 
and far between and those that do exist can have little effect on deforestation) 
whilst, a t  the other extreme, there are communities that exist solely to take 
advantage of the trade flow and which simply could not support themselves 
without this external contact. In many areas i t  is possible to choose some 
optimal mix between these two extremes. Some--the caut ious cultivators- 
*Though the two often go together, poverty is to be distinguished from destitution. Destitution is s 
bio-physical concept, poverty a social one. 
stay a t  home to farm and are content to produce a small surplus of grain over 
and above their own requirements; others-the adventurous traders-make do 
with a minimum of agricultural production and direct most of their energies 
to the business of trade. [Fiirer-Haimendorf 19751 
So interdependence, not independence, is the mountain rule and the sig- 
nificant (and policy relevant) differences that emerge are those between the 
different ways in which that  interdependence is taken up. Those in the Middle 
Ranges tend to adopt the low risk/low reward option of cautious cultivation 
and a small production surplus* ;those in the higher valleys tend to adopt the 
high risk/high reward option of adventurous trading and some farming in the 
background. This bifurcation of risk-handling strategies is remarkably pro- 
nounced and, as well as being reflected in the Middle Ranges/high valleys set- 
tlement patterns. usually corresponds with the profound cultural division 
between Hindus and Buddhists. Yet, despite this separation, each strategy 
depends for its viability upon the other. The myriad cautious cultivators sell 
or barter their small surpluses to  the adventurous traders who, in their turn, 
use this grain to supplement their own meagre production and to form one 
half of their lucrative trade with the Tibetan plateau. To the adventurous 
trader, tourism is just another kind of trade and many have already switched 
across to it. The development of this industry has, fortuitously, coincided with 
the decline of the traditional trade with Tibet (as a consequence, in the short 
term, of the Chinese occupation of Tibet and, in the longer term, of the substi- 
tution of cheap Indian salt for Tibetan salt throughout the Middle Ranges). So 
the interdependence system remains essentially the same; it is just that  the 
surpluses of the cautious cultivators now find their way, via the adventurous 
traders, into tourism rather than into Tibet. 
This system of interdependence would break down if the presently 
increasing population of the Middle Ranges were to  reach the point where 
there was no longer a net  surplus of grain.** Or a t  least, it would break down if 
new industries did not appear in the meantime. As was the case with Switzer- 
land and Austria, the most likely new industry is tourism.*** 
It is  the adventurous traders, with their opportunism and their 
entrepreneurial flair, who respond most readily to this new industry. Some 
(like the Sherpas) have established a virtual monopoly in certain areas, but, a t  
the same time, some of the cautious cultivators (Tamang villagers on the 
fringe of the Kathmandu valley, for instance) have switched across to  the 
adventurous trader's strategy in order to take fuller advantage of this newly 
available opportunity. So these strategies, though they exhibit a certain rigi- 
dity, are not immutable-they are, as it  were, a function of the social context 
that,  paradoxically seemingly, is largely their creation.**** 
*Sometimes they will augment this by periods of seasonal labour in the Indian plains or by more 
lengthy absences as mercenaries in the British or Indian armies or in the Singapore riot police. As 
one moves further west along the Himalayas so the interplay of arable and pastoral strategies b e  
comes more sigmficant. 'I'he tranehumanic and semi-nomadic Gaddis and Gujars move their flocks 
of aheep a d  goats and their herds of buffalo through the settled populations along traditionally es- 
tablished, but still changing, mutes that are sustained by innumerable exchange relationships 
(~rtubble-grazing for manuring, for instance) of quite staggering sequential and spatial complexity. 
**For a fuller description of these relationships see Fbrer-Hdmendorf (1975 final chepter). 
***The latest five Year Plan for Nepal [HMG l m l ]  shows serious shortfalls in almost all i ts industri- 
al targets with only tourism surging f a r  beyond what was expected of it. In Bhutan, tourism is ex- 
pected to become the principle industry in the Bhumtang area (Jest and Stein 1682). 
****For some discussion of the complex processes by which plural socially induced strategies are 
stabilized and transformed, see. Marriott (1867) and Thompson (1082). 
We will return presently to discuss the practical implications of these 
socially induced strategies but, for the  moment, i t  is sufficient to note tha t  
the strategies exist, that  they are stabilized by an individual's social context. 
that  the  process of institutional development inevitably results in changes in 
the social contexts of some individuals, that  such changes can sometimes 
result in the displacement of an individual from one strategy to  another, and 
that  (where points of leverage exist within this development process) there 
eldsts the  possibility of intervening in such a way as to  encourage the dis- 
placement of certain "borderline" individuals from a less desirable to a more 
desirable strategy. Lest i t  appear that  all this- smacks too much of social 
engineering, we would point out  tha t  any policy implementation displaces peo- 
ple from one socially induced strategy to another, often unwittingly and often 
in an undesirable direction. 
INSIGHTS AND SYSTEMIC CONNECTIONS 3: 
THE MANAGEMENT OF POWERLESSNESS 
Over the  centuries the  great  empires have always run out of steam a t  the  
Himalayas. The Moghul Empire, though it  ruled all the  plains, could not forci- 
bly convert to  lslam the Rajput kingdoms that  took refuge in Kangra, Kulu. 
Garhwal and Jumla; neither the  British nor the  Russian Empire, for all their 
bitter rivalry, was able to win the  Great Game (as it  was called) and subjugate 
Afghanistan; further  east,  the  British simply gave u p  trying to  incorporate 
Nepal into their  empire; and, on the  other side of Nepal, the  Chinese Empire 
had little option but to  leave Tibet autonomous and independent in all but 
token claim. In geopolitical terms the  Himalayas a r e  not a power vacuum-for 
that  would imply tha t  they could readily be filled--but, rather,  a sort of pla- 
teau where the  power of the plains finally becomes so attenuated that it  can 
no longer sway events one way or the other. The Himalayas, in consequence, 
are a vast political marg in -a  largely uncontrolled tract  filled with a rich 
assortment of independent-minded opportunists and refugees. 
For those who have become accustomed to  understanding human affairs 
in te rms of power relationships the  Himalayas a re  a s  baffling as is  weightless- 
ness t o  those pragmatists long used to operating with their  feet planted firmly 
on t h e  ground. Himalayan politics, in countries like Nepal and Bhutan, a r e  
more concerned with the  management of powerlessness than with the direct 
exercise of power. The difference is akin to tha t  between judo and prize- 
fighting. The consummate skill of the recent kings of Nepal (and, before them,  
of the  hereditary Prime Ministers) has  resulted in a delicate display in which 
the balance of the  slight central figure is maintained by continually playing 
off the  various superpowers (and, more recently. the  various international 
agencies) against one another. 
Development experts have now learnt to their cost that  the  impressive 
arrays of policy levers displayed in the ministries of many of the less- 
developed countries are,  all too often, not connected to  anything. This is usu- 
ally interpreted as a symptom of underdevelopment; the  conclusion is tha t  
they should be connected and that  satisfactory development will become pos- 
sible once they are  connected. But such a conclusion would be valid only if 
the political system was based upon the direct exercise of power. 1n a system 
The curious politics of the Nepalese budgetary process, for instance, makes sense only when inter- 
~r e t e d  in t h s  light (Wildavskg and Caiden 1974). For a detailed eccount of Nepalese politics see 
Rose and Scholz (1980) and for Bhutun see Rose (1871). 
based upon the  management of powerlessness the fact that the policy levers 
are not connected to anything may demonstrate neither underdevelopment, 
nor inefficiency, nor oversight; rather, i t  may confirm that everything is func- 
tioning correctly. It would be as well to bear this perhaps alarming possibility 
in mind when devising policies aimed at  alleviating the environmental and 
developmental problems of the Himalayas. 
From this geopolitical perspective Himalayan deforestation (and other 
concomitants of environmental decline) is just another specific instance of 
the problematical relationship between centre and periphery--between empire 
and margin. The power lies in the plains but the  problem lies in the hills. 
What should the centre do? Over the centuries there have always been two 
options: impose or interpose. The establishment of a forestry service and the 
designation of Reserve Forests (such as occurred along the Himalayan fringe 
of British India) is an imposed solution. When effectively implemented, it 
makes both visible and actual the uneven distribution of power and, in so 
doing, incorporates the  mountains into the empire. The judicious fostering of 
Buffer States (such as occurred with Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet) is an 
interposed solution. Deciding that (beyond a certain point) it  is less trouble 
simply to leave well alone, the empire deliberately holds back and, in effect, 
guarantees the  autonomy of the mountains in exchange for their absorption of 
the pressures that  the empire would be exposed to if it were to move up and 
take control of them. In this way, an arrangement that appears quite natural 
often turns out to  be largely contrived and, when this implicit compact 
between empire and margin breaks down, we often see the empire switching 
over to imposed solutions-Younghusband's punitive expedition to Lhasa, for 
instance, and India's recent annexation of Sikkim. 
Though the autonomy of the Himalayan margin is always tenuous, in that  
it  has always been at the mercy of the great powers that surround it, i t  has 
always proved to be remarkably resilient. In many instances it has crystal- 
lised out into small nations; in others it  is continually being manifested in the  
de f m t o  independence of Indian citizens far-removed from the centres of 
power (e.g. the Chipko Movement). As the fortunes of the mighty empires wax 
and wane, and as they switch back and forth between imposed and interposed 
solutions, so autonomy is swept away here and reasserted there. The Chinese 
occupied Tibet in the 1950s, thereby stimulating the deployment of Indian 
troops and the construction of strategic roads in Lahoul and Ladakh in the 
west and in Assam and the North East Frontier Agency in the east; in the early 
1970s Nepal secured the removal from its soil of the Indian Military Mission; in 
the late 1970s India annexed neighbouring Sikkim; more recently the Tibetan 
guerilla forces,having been expelled from Nepal, moved across into the vast 
wastes of Ladakh, Spiti and Rupshu, thereby providing a very effective 
intelligence-gathering screen that allowed India to pull the bulk of its forces 
back into warmer and more congenial garisons.' And, behind all these surface 
events, the Great Game (with the United States replacing Britain in the sha- 
dowy struggle with Russia) still continues. 
At  first glance it might seem that, with these kinds of strategic priorities 
dictating the ever-changing geopolitics of the whole region. there really is no 
chance of devising and implementing any policies for arresting the  environ- 
mental decline of the  Himalayas. But perhaps we could relate these policies, 
*But not the forces facing Pakistan. They are still in place in Ladakh and imposed solutions have 
long since eroded the autonomy of the buffer--Kashmir end  Jammu-that used to keep them apart. 
See Faux (1962). 
not to the erratic and inherently unpredictable political situations, but to the 
ever-present and unchanging principles that  underlie that turbulent flux? 
These principles all have to do with the implicit compact that, so long as it is 
observed, guarantees the autonomy of the margin-the continued existence of 
the buffer states. 
Because of the power imbalance between the centre and the margin. this 
compact is curiously asymmetrical. If the centre can get what i t  wants 
without having to push on all the way to the point where it finally runs out of 
steam then i t  will be prepared to hold back and guarantee the autonomy of the 
buffer that such a holding-back creates. The buffer state, for its part, knows 
full well that its autonomy depends upon this compact being observed but it 
also knows that,  thanks to its powerlessness, it can only do what i t  can do to 
maintain the compact. If, despite all its efforts, the nuisance (be it Chinese 
soldiers or silt- laden floodwater) breaks through the buffer then it knows that  
the centre will be forced to switch from interposed to imposed solutions. So, 
on this analysis, the autonomous margin will have a keen strategic interest in 
alleviating the flooding of the plains. Given that  it will want to  do something 
about the flooding, the question then is: can it? And the policy question for 
all those international agencies that are concerned about Himalayan defores- 
tation is: is there anything that  they can do that  might help to change the  
margin's answer from no to yes. 
Of course, this assumes that there is a causal connection between the  
downstream flooding and the upstream deforestation. Since both the Nepalese 
and Indian governments (and perhaps others as well) are a t  present disposed 
to make this assumption, there is some practical sense in treating this as  the  
political, if not the physical, reality. 
In this particular instance i t  so happens that the sorts of solutions urged 
by those who are convinced that  there is a connection are very similar to the  
sorts of solutions urged by those who are convinced that there is no connec- 
tion and also by those (like us) who are convinced that, given the  present 
state of knowledge. we cannot tell whether there is a connection or not. But 
there is much more to it than this, and this serious predicament-whether to 
go for the physical reality or the  political r e a l i t y i s  precisely what the  institu- 
tional approach is designed to handle. 
We have, so far, said very little about the physical facts and we have said 
even less about the numbers that  scientists habitually use to express such 
physical facts. But this does not mean that  we have not looked a t  any 
numbers; we have looked a t  thousands of them, and we have collated and com- 
pared them. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that i t  is  our considered 
conclusion that  there is a t  present only one number that has any scientific 
validity a t  all, and that is the number 67--the factor by which all the expert 
estimates of the per capita rate of fuelwood consumption vary. This analysis 
of the  scale and nature of the uncertainty a t  the bio-physical level, and of the 
institutional forces that are all the time generating and maintaining that  
uncertainty, is a lengthy and technical business (which we summarise in the  
next chapter) but one of the perhaps surprising conclusions that  emerges 
from i t  is that  whilst i t  is extraordinarily difficult to come up with any useful 
dhd valid physical facts it is quite easy to come up with useful and valid insti- 
tutional facts. 
When this contrast between what we might call the shifting sands of q y -  
sical fact and the solid rock of institutional fact is set beside the practjcal 
good sense of dealing with the political reality rather than with the physical 
reality, the case for adopting the appropriate institutional development 
approach becomes overwhelming. This does not, of course, mean that we 
should wash our hands of the bio-physical level and abandon all efforts a t  
increasing the certainty of the physical data. Indeed, one of the key strategic 
implications of this institutional approach is that  i t  helps to pinpoint the sorts 
of physical facts that  it would be most valuable to  know and. out of those facts, 
the ones that  we are  most likely to be able to  know. 
THE CONCEPTUAL F W E  WORK AND ITS PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Generalising a t  a high level of abstraction we have, at the macro level, a 
system based on the implicit compact and manifested in the dynamics of 
imposition and interposition and, a t  the micro level, we have a system based 
upon interdependence and manifested in the dynamics of recruitment to the  
cautious cultivator and adventurous trader strategies. These geopolitical and 
socio-cultural systems, as well a s  being related to each other (by the 
processes of power accumulation, centralization and decentralization- 
processes that are realized through the reciprocal dynamics of consent and 
authority that mediate the ever-changing relationship between these levels) 
are in turn, connected to the bio-physical systems of resource exploitation 
which currently, by most of the  expert accounts, would seem to be pro- 
grammed (via the increasing population of the cautious cultivators) for 
deforestation, denudation, degradation and, eventually, desertification. Some- 
where along this downhill path there is the crucial threshold point a t  which 
the Middle Ranges cease to be a net  exporter of grains. In the absence of any 
institutionally appropriate development, the  crossing of this threshold will 
trigger the collapse of the interdependence system (and, one presumes, of the 
implicit compact system as well). 
So, on this analysis, the absolutely key variable is development's mode of 
entry into these linked systems. In other words, can the processes of develop- 
ment be steered in such a way that  technical and institutional capacities (the 
positive-sum game) can get  ahead of population and natural resource con- 
straints ( the  negative-sum game)? With this momentous question in mind, we 
can distinguish a number of crucial responses a t  the micro-level. 
1. I t  seems that the cautious cultivator's strategy a t  present results in 
increasing population (perhaps i t  always has done) whilst the adventurous 
trader's strategy seems always to  have resulted in a stable population. 
More research would be needed to  substantiate this important distinction 
but the empirical evidence that  is at present available (institutions such 
as fraternal polyandry, monasteries and nunneries with celibate inmates, 
and primogeniture rules of inheritance on the Buddhist side and, on the 
Hindu side, large families as guarantees for support in old age giving way 
t o  smaller families in situations where old age pensions are guaranteed) 
does all point in this direction. 
2. Population pressure8* coupled with limited resources (agricultural land 
for grain production, grazing land for animal husbandry and forest land 
for fuelwood, fodder and forest products generally) is the main cause of 
environmental degradation and of the undesirable downstream effects 
generally.*** Ethno-ecological studies [Johnson e t  al. 19821 go on to  
*Because of the ertreme heterogeneity of the region this threshold will not be reached everywhere 
at the same time. So the collapse will be spasmodic md cumulative rather than instantaneous. 
**But with the proviso that the effect of population is relative to institutional and technical capaci- 
ties. The statement holda if population increases and these capacities do not. 
***Whether these downstream effects exist transfiationally is, at present, an open questiau, but the 
suggest that  i t  is population pressures tha t  cause the hill farmer to 
switch from the detensification of land use to the intensification of land 
use in response to his (impressively accurate) perception of landslide 
(and other) hazards. 
This means that,  for every individual who is absorbed into new industries, the  
direct pressure on land-based resources is correspondingly reduced. The popu- 
lation remains the  same, of course, but the pressure to intensify land use is 
diminished. A t  the  same time, those individuals who enter  developing indus- 
tries such as tourism are  likely to switch over to the adventurous trader  stra- 
tegy and this trend should in the longer term, result in a diminution of the  
ra te  of population increase. 
So tourism, (and other industries that  are not directly land-based), sensi- 
tively handled*, could result in a quite rapid relaxation of the  pressure tha t  
the present population increase is placing on the land in general and on the  
forest in particular whilst, in the  longer term, i t  could act  so  a s  t o  stabilise 
the population itself. This is not to suggest that  tourism is  the  only way of 
doing something to  remedy the environmental problems of the Himalayas but 
only tha t  i t  might provide us  with an e x e m p l a r 4  paradigm as it  w e r e l o r  the  
designing of policies and policy instruments in situations characterized, at 
the macro level, by the management of powerlessness and, a t  the  micro level, 
by a cause that  is the  aggregation of the strategically determined acts  of 
myriad individual agents. 
m. SOME STRATEGIC MPL~CATIONS 
There is a growing awareness tha t  conventional approaches t o  develop 
ment  in the  Himalayan region have been a largely frustrating experience. 
Increasingly, those'who work in the development field are having to  step back 
from their problem to  ask themselves what has gone wrong with the i r  solution. 
There has been an inadequate use of learning in develop- 
ment  programs. The short-term, result-oriented, project 
approach is doomed. We have to be very modest. There is  
an  enormous need for humility both in our capacity to 
understand and intervene in these processes.** 
In all humility. we propose the appropriate ins ti tutional development 
experts are all agreed that they do exist within the Himalayan states and regions and that they 
constitute a serious problem. 
%ere is, of course, the argument that tourism too is  land-based in that i t  makes rapacious 
demands on food and fuelwood (and on labour that otherwise would have been committed to tigri- 
cultural production). Tourism is often castigated as the goose that lays the golden eggs and fouls 
its o m  nest in the procem, and this indeed is orten the case. But, as the Austrian example shown, 
tourism can be handled in such a way a to maximise the golden eggs and minimise the nest-fouling 
and, as we explain in the next chapter, the Himalayea margin is rather well-equipped institutional- 
ly  to handle tourism in this way. 
**John Cool (Agricultural Development Council, Kathmandu). Stuternent made in introductory re- 
marks a t  the International Workshop on the Problems of Mountain Renewable Resources Develop 
ment held a t  Yohonk, New York, December 1982. 
approach as a useful way of simultaneously learning about the development 
process and, through that  learning, of identifying the points of leverage that  
furnish the only opportunities for us to intervene constructively in that  pro- 
cess. 
Development, on this humble view, is something altogether greater than 
the totality of development projects. Development encompasses the whole 
process; development projects can be usefully fed in only a t  such points of lev- 
erage as exist within that process. Mark Twain's advice--not to let your child's 
schooling interfere with his education-has, we suggest, a counterpart on the 
macro level-not to let your nation's development projects interfere with its 
development. 
The strategic implications of this humble approach can be explored by 
way of three substantive manifestations of this important distinction between 
development and development projects. First, the matching and mismatching 
of technical fixes and institutional supports; second, the intervention implica- 
tions of "top-down" and "bottom-up" development; third, the relative merits of 
"grand design" and "tinkering" solutions. 
STRATEGIC EXPLORATIONS 1 : 
TECHNICAL FlXES AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORTS 
One convenient way of bringing the conceptual framework down to earth 
is to quickly search through the literature to extract from it  a list of techni- 
cally feasible prescriptions-technical fixes-from galvanized gabions to intra- 
uterine devices, from solar stoves to mini-hydro, from miracle rice to compul- 
sory re-settlement, from eucalyptus groves to social forests ... and so on, and 
then to offer them up to our conceptual framework [in the building trade 
sense of seeing whether the new part will fit with the existing (w)hole] so as to  
get some feel for whether they are likely or not to enjoy institutional support. 
Since "technical fix" tends nowadays to be used as a euphemism for technical 
fixation, we should stress that  we are  not using it in this pejorative sense. 
Whilst we would reject the bone-headed approach that, when a Ax bumps up 
against an institution, insists that  i t  is the institution alone that  will have to 
give way, we feel that  that  approach is today little in evidence and that, by and ' 
large; the quite clearly perceived cooperative challenge is to bring some sen- 
sitivity to this "offering up" exercise in which technical fixes meet  up with, or 
are rejected by, their institutional supports. 
Since for many of these technical fixes the appropriate "delivery" level is 
the village whilst the "provider" level is that  of central 
govemment/international agency, there is always the likelihood of institu- 
tional mismatch; a "good project will enjoy macro-institutional support ( that  
is why it's "good") but quite possibly will not enjoy micro-level support. So 
there is, first of all, a problem of i n s t i t a d i o d  t t m f e r a  problem that  is 
often made even worse by being misinterpreted as a problem of technology 
transfer. Conversely, projects that  would probably enjoy institutional support 
a t  the village level are often strangled a t  birth because they do not  have sup- 
port a t  the macro-level, and therefore come off the project production line as 
"bad" projects. 
With this simple idea we can offer up technical fixes to these two levels- 
macro and village/individualand put pluses and m.inuses against them 
according to whether they will enjoy institutional support or not. At this stage 
we should also try to flesh out this scorecard with development vignettes-  
little case studies--that illustrate the various permutations. However, whilst 
we do have quite a number of these vignettes, we feel that i t  would be invidi- 
ous to parade them in this way. Instead, we prefer to leave the "development 
vignette" boxes blank and to invite the thoughtful reader to fill them in from 
his own experience, and to his own satisfaction. 
Figure 1. The simple scorecard 
But, of course, each of these levels is not institutionally homogeneous. At 
the village level, for instance, landlords may support and tenants may not, or 
vice versa. At the  macro level an  international agency might support and a 
ministry might not, or vice versa. So we have to  be prepared to break down 
the scorecard even a t  these specific levels so as to take account of institu- 
tional plurality and institutional contention. As we do this our increasingly 
complex matrix of pluses and minuses carries us, a t  the village level, right 
into the realities of power as manifested in the land tenure system and, a t  the 
macro level, takes us  into the realities of power as manifested in the manage- 
ment  of impotence and in the vertical integration/horizontal insulation of 
ministerial sectors. 
Once these two institutionally mediated power struggles have been 
revealed in this way, we can begin to offer some prescriptive guidelines for 
their evaluation and modification. At  the village level, anything that  
increases the  security and local control of the peasant farmer will also 
increase the total quantity of power within the wider system. But there are 
some constraints. I t  would, for instance, be difficult to  do this in ways that  did 
not a t  the same time benefit the landlord. So there has to be facilitation 
between these two institutions-landlord and tenant. Such facilitation would 
focus on the land tenure system which, contrary to prevalent belief. can a t  
certain times and in certain places become quite flexible. For instance, in 
recent years rather diffuse rent  strikes in the Kathmandu Valley have, by and 
large, been accepted by the landlords who, having seen the writing on the wall, 
have been easing away from investments in agricultural land and towards new 
business opportunities in and around the capital (a move, incidentally, that  
severs the equation of land with wealth). A few landlords, however, did take 
legal action to obtain their rents but the courts found in favour of the tenants. 
So here we have an instance of quite rapid, and quite large, de fac to  and & 
jure change in the land tenure system. 
At the macro level the concern of the facilitator should be more complex. 
The aim should be to promote the integration of institutions in such a way as, 
first, to increase the quantity of power in  the system and, second, to increase 
or decrease its concentration--depending on the achieved level of economic 
and political development. We would not claim that  such judgment is easy. 
but we would point out that the apparent paradox of simultaneously increasing 
village level autonomy and concentrating power at the centre can perhaps be 
resolved by fractionating the issue. Such simultaneous aims are sometimes 
the appropriate goals of inter-institutional facilitation, particularly in cases 
involving the improvement of local incentives for increased private invest- 
ment in agricultural land. Again, the issue is the land tenure system and the 
solution is for some fractions (e.g. ultimate title) to go to the centre and for 
others (e.g. rights of usufruct) to go to the periphery. When we look, we find 
that the land tenure systems in the Himalayas always have been fractionated 
(for all sorts of pragmatic reasons) and may. therefore, prove to be quite 
amenable to this sort of approach. [Regmi 19761 
However, to fully resolve this paradox we do need to examine another pol- 
itical (constitutional, even) variable-consent. A particular configuration of 
institutions functions as a total system only when two opposed flows regulate 
their exchange relationshipsauthority from top to bottom and consent from 
bottom to top. Individuals (or groups with representative individuals) can 
readily negotiate these exchange relationships to reach positions where each 
party is better off than they were before, but diffuse institutions (which 
abound in the Himalayas-castes. for instance) often require some sort of 
third party facilitation. 
STRATEGIC EXPLORATIONS 2: 
SMART MARKETS AND STUPID PROJECTS 
So these rough "scorecards" (both the simple and the complex ones) 
should give us some useful indications of technical fixes that, i f  pushed 
through a t  the macro level, would probably "take" a t  the micro level. At  the  
same time, they might give an early warning system for those "good" projects 
that  will probably be disasters once they are pushed down to the village level. 
But these sorts of prescriptions4ensitive and helpful though they a r e a r e  
not all that we can get out of this approach. In a way. they begin to provide a 
map of key contextual boundaries. Indeed, i t  may be best to regard them just 
as a s t a g e a  heuristic device--for moving to a dekper and, to some extent, 
more familiar synthesis. 
An economist, on seeing one of the complex "scorecards" with its vague 
patterns of pluses and minuses, would be eager to translate i t  into his fami- 
liar. and powerful, notions: market incentives and social sanctions. So (aside 
from the serious but handleable quibble that market incentives are  a particu- 
lar  kind of social sanction) i t  should be feasible to move on from this rather ad 
hoc approach to a more coherent framework that  takes its shape. not just 
from technical fixes and mixed institutional responses to them, but slso from 
the social processes that  underlie them. [What we have in mind here is the 
appropriation to the business of institutional development of the new imtih- 
tional economics*. We can here do no more than mention this possibility and 
*In which markets, hierarchies and egalitarian groups (sects) are seen as competing, yet comple- 
mentary, crangements for the handling of social trensnctions. ,Each has its advantages and its 
disadvantages and the concern is not with which one is right-that is a meaningless question--but 
with the question of appropriateness: "which kinds of transactions are best handled by whch kind 
underline the rich promise that it holds.] 
Returning to the simple "scorecard" for a moment, it is interesting to 
note a certain asymmetry within its matrix. If we draw a diagonal from the 
top left to the bottom right corner then we can see that  the projects in the top 
right triangle often come to pass whilst those in the bottom left triangle tend 
to remain hypothetical. The reason, of course, is that projects have first to 
pass through the needle's eye of macro level acceptance before they can go on 
to be realized at  the micro level. The message is simple but profound: there 
is n o  "bottom up" approach. 
The profundity of this message becomes apparent once we observe that, 
whilst there can be no "bottom up" development projects (i-e. interventions), 
there is lots of "bottom up" development (i.e. process). Not to heed this mes- 
sage can lead to needless and wasteful difficulties. To modify what they say in 
Chicago, "Projects may be stupid but markets are always smart". 
In the trees beside the monastery a t  Tangboche in Khumbu there is a 
curious triangular building of wood and glass that looks as if i t  has just been 
dropped there from out of the sky. We suspect that this is indeed how it got 
there, since it is a part  of a New Zealand aid project for the Everest National 
Park and the  Park Warden's pre-fabricated house (and even his cast iron Aga 
stove) were flown in by Pilatus Porter. This triangular oddity--the Tangboche 
Trekkers' Lodge-is a tourist facility and, since tourists need facilities, its 
presence there might, on reflection, seem reasonable enough. But just 
around the corner from it,  tacked onto the outside wall of the monastery in an 
agreeably higgledy-piggledy way, is a thriving chang-house-cum-yak- 
caravanserai that  has over the years effortlessly evolved to cope with the 
unpredictably changing volume and structure of the passing trade. 
Of course, this is a fairly trivial example but it does serve to  illustrate a 
serious disability-project blindness. -411 too often we cannot see the 
unplanned (and free) indigenous success for the planned (and costly) alien 
failure that, we have convinced ourselves, should be the solution to the prob- 
lem. What problem? Just as, if there is no solution. there is no problem so 
too, if the solution is already in place, there is no problem. This is not to say 
that markets are always right and that planning is always wrong; only that we 
should develop a feel for the different sorts of contexts that  render the one 
more appropriate than the  other. In the case of the Tangboche Trekkers' 
Lodge this feel has not  been developed, with the  result that  the "top down" 
development project has failed to mesh constructively with the "bottom up" 
development process. One great  advantage of markets, when i t  comes to pro- 
ject blindness, is that  they are  like mushrooms-when conditions are not 
appropriate you don't see them, and when conditions are appropriate they 
spring up overnight. All you have to do is watch t o  see where markets do 
spring up and where they do not spring up and that  pattern will reveal to you 
the underlying institutional deployment of market incentives and social sanc- 
tions. For example: 
h a h  Kosi, Nepal The Sherpa wealth that is generated in Kathmandu tourism 
pours back into Khumbu. The regular Sunday market in 
Namche has grown, and is still growing, at  an astonishing 
rate and, as it grows, it sucks into its ever-widening orbit 
more and more of the downstream inhabitants. I t  is now worth 
t,he while of many of these Rai villagers to walk for a week 
of institutional arrangement?" 
or more carrying loads of grain, pork and other produce 
to this market and many have established regular contractual 
agreements whereby a Sherpa trader guarantees to  buy (at 
an agreed lower price) the surplus that  may be left over if 
market business has not been brisk enough. 
Kali Gandaki. Nepal The Thakkalis of this valley put even the Sherpas in the shade. 
Their traditional services along this caravan and pilgrim 
route have adapted effortlessly and ingeniously to take 
advantage of the tourist throng that  now passes along this 
most popular of trekking routes. Across the  Thorong La, the 
Manangbhotis are doing much the same but have also negotiated 
with the government special trade concessions with Bangkok 
to compensate (so they argued) for their lost trade with 
Tibet. 
Kdu/Ladakh, h d i a  Throughout this vast stretch of country there are  many, 
sometimes tragic, instances in which the indigenous 
and essentially unplanned local enterprise is a t  odds with the 
imposed "solutions". 
firpet a d  The Tibetan carpet industry has thrived, both in India and 
Tanka hdustr ies  Nepal. There are, however, some interesting differences. 
In Dharmsala the Dalai Lama has imposed quite str ict  quality 
control (of both materials and design); in Kathmandu quality 
control has been left to the discretion of individual 
entrepreneurs, the result being a wider range of products 
with the traditional quality end remaining largely in Tibetan 
hands while the cheaper and more exuberant end has been 
developed more by Newaris. The increasing commercial 
production of tanka paintings--an activity much decried 
by a r t  historians--seems to be dominated by individual Tamang 
artists.  
7he %mi, Nepal The clearing and settlement of this formerly malarial 
t rac t  during the 1960s and '70s is a smaller scale 
repetition of the sort of process that took place on the 
plains of India almost a century earlier. In the Nepalese 
case the process was planned but the planners were unable 
to  control the process. As has happened so often in both 
urban and rural development around the world, squatters have 
produced a fait accompli that is very different from 
what the planners had in mind. 
Ehumthang, Bhutan The preliminary plans for the development of 
tourism in this area [Jest and Stein 19821 are flexibly 
designed so that they can readily be evaluated and adapted 
as they meet up with just this sort of unruly "bottom up" 
development in the course of their implementation. The 
planners concede that unplanned change is inevitable and 
that  much of the planning process should be concerned 
with preparing for this--both for the unplanned change 
tha t  can be anticipated and for that  which cannot. 
~ h k s e  plans, i t  would seem, provide an interesting 
example of appropriate institutional development 
planning which should be carefully monitored for the  
valuable lessons i t  will provide. 
To summarize, the great perceptual corrective in the institutional 
approach is that  i t  draws our eyes away from the technical fixes and 
prescribed solutions that are handed down from on high and towards the dif- 
fuse and pluralized institutional reality on low-what is actually happening in 
and to the development process. We can see from the markets tha t  spring up 
what is being ingested and why, and we can see from the project failures what 
is being rejected and why. Eager to learn from development history, and 
equipped with some conceptual understanding of these two forces that  shape 
the development process--acceptance through markets and rejection through 
social sanctions-we can now begin to approach environmental policy in a 
potentially useful way. 
STRATEGIC EXPLORATIONS 3: GRAND DESIGN KTRTUS TINKERING 
Though markets are always smar t  (they are defined as such) they a re  not 
always eco-smart. Though sanctions exist for good social reasons they are  not 
always there for good ecological reasons. We can ask (and reasonably expect 
an answer) whether current  markets and sanctions (as they a re  variously 
deployed in specific Himalayan settings) a re  eco-smart or not, and we can 
then go on to ask whether there are  any policy options/instruments tha t  
might help to strengthen those that  are eco-smart already, and to  steer in a 
smarter  eco-direction those that  are not. 
What this means, in practice, is: 
(1) Close, careful and continuous observation, evaluation and monitoring of 
specific on-the-ground processes. For example. of the  Namche Market 
and its effects upon the  strategies of the  Rai who are  increasingly drawn 
into its orbit, of the environmental effects of these changing Rai stra- 
tegies, of the environmental effects of all this a t  the Namche end as  well, 
and so on. Another example would be t o  design this sort  of monitoring 
and learning component into the  development plan for the  Bhumtang 
area of Bhutan from the  very beginning. 
(2) Continual facilitation (again, in specific on-the-ground contexts) aimed a t  
revealing patterns of social sanctions that  are way below the  Pareto 
optimum and, thereby, helping them to readjust into a more optimal con- 
figuration. Such revelation is not just for the edification of the  facilitator 
and the "decision maker"; to be effective it  has to be a mutual process 
tha t  involves all the  people who are  actually applying the sanctions. 
For example, a social forestry project team arrived in a Nepalese village and 
immediately set about clearing lines (in preparation for planting the  
eucalyptus saplings they had brought with them) through the  sad-and-sorry 
remnant  of a forest that  they found there: To their surprise and dismay, they 
were se t  upon by the villagers who. brandishing sticks and kukri.s (large 
curved knives) chased them out of the  forest and refused to let them back in. 
The members of the team, anxious to  do what they had come to  do and fully 
authorised by the government to do it, found themselves unable t o  do it. They 
*We are indebted to Jeff Rornm for this vignete. 
had two options: go away or t ry  to talk to  the villagers. They chose the  latter.  
What had so incensed the  villagers, they learnt,  were the  straight lines 
and the eucalyptus saplings. Though straight lines and eucalyptus saplings 
spelt good forestry practice to the  team, they spelt unwelcome government 
control to the villagers. (Fences, too, it turns out, can be similarly repugnant 
a t  the village level and in some recent  successfully facilitated social forestry 
projects the villagers have actually persuaded the  government not to go to  the  
expense of putting fences around the  forests and have themselves provided, 
and paid for, forest caretakers instead). As they talked t o  each other,  the  
divergent aesthetics of the  team members and the villagers became more and 
more apparent to  them both. As the  leader of the  project put  it, "It gradually 
became clear to us  tha t  our idea of what a healthy forest looked like was very 
different from their idea of what a healthy forest looked like". He described 
the facilitation process tha t  eventually got the  team back into the forest (but 
this time with the  approval of the villagers) a s  a negotiation between these two 
aesthetics. Each side conceded tha t  the existing forest was way short of its 
aesthetic ideal. It  was, they both agreed, an ugly forest. 
In other words, i t  was sub-optimal, and the  issue was not whether i t  should 
be changed or  not--both agreed tha t  it  should be--but how i t  should be 
changed. The team's aesthetic and the  villagers' aesthetic defined different 
directions of change, and the  big question was whether these paths could be 
reconciled. The two aesthetics, fortunately, turned out  not to be fundamen- 
tally contradictory and, s tep by step, the  villagers and t h e  team negotiated a 
synthetic aesthetic that  integrated much of the  good practice of the  social 
foresters into much of the  traditional practice of the villagers, and discarded 
the straight lines and the  eucalyptus saplings in the  process.. 
All this was several years ago, and the leader of the  team has recently 
revisited the  area. The forest now, h e  says, looks nothing like the  idea he had 
then of what a healthy forest should look like but  he is adamant that ,  
nevertheless, i t  is a healthy forest. "The whole thing", he says, "has been a 
revelation t o  me." 
All the  strategic implications of the  appropriate institutional approach 
are captured by this vignette. Rrs t ,  we see the vigorous rejection a t  the  
micro level of certain technical fixes--straight lines and  eucalyptus saplings- 
that had already received institutional support a t  the  macro level. And, in the  
facilitation process that  follows on from the project's acceptance of this rejec- 
tion, we see the sort of backtracking that  i s  needed t o  modify the  "top down" 
approach so tha t  i t  meshes constructively with the "bottom up" development 
that  it encounters as i t  makes the  transition from the  "provider" level to  the  
"delivery" Level. 
Second, this backtracking exercise clearly demonstrates the  veracity and 
strategic importance of t h e  assertion: there is no "bottom up" approach. Only 
when the project has come down from the  top to  the  bottom can i t  then  turn  
around and s tar t  to  move from the  bottom to  the top. And, as the  descending 
development project meets  up  with the ascending development process, we 
see clearly the sort  of mutual  learning and adaptation that,  when feasible. 
reveals both the existence of a point of leverage and the  means by which con- 
structive leverage can be applied t o  it. 
*For those who would like to know what can be constructively done when the divergent aesthetics 
ww fundamentally contradictory, the answer is nothing. 
Third, we see that facilitation is possible only when the divergent aesthet- 
ics are not fundamentally contradictory and that, in consequence, points of 
leverage do not exist everywhere within the development process. In other 
words, much of the development process lies beyond t.he reach of deliberate 
intervention. We can intervene constructively only a t  those points where con- 
structive intervention is possible. Yet it  seems to us that the Grand Design 
approach to development planning refuses to accept this limitation* limita- 
tion that, if accepted, would allow us only a tinkering role in the development 
process. (This distinction between Grand Design and Tinkering, we should 
stress, has nothing to do with the scale of development projects. The size of a 
tinkering project should be appropriate to its point OF leverage.) 
Students of urban development are a t  last coming to realise that  the city 
is a social work of art which has a design but not a designer and that, in conse- 
quence, those who would aspire to remake it by grand and conscious design 
are being ludicrously presumptuous [Rowe and Koetter 19811. The same les- 
son holds for those who would do something for the Himalayas. Just as the 
megalomaniac quest for the blueprint for the modern city is giving way to  a 
humbler effort to understand the diffuse business of bricolage by which the 
city changes, so developers-in-the-large are at last shifting their focus from 
immaculate technological prescriptions to the institutional details that keep 
getting in the way of those prescriptions. As this focus changes so the need 
for understanding increases. Understand the diffuse institutionally generated 
processes by which the system you would intervene in is maintained and 
transformed and you will then have some clues as to where there might be 
some leverage--some chance of nudging it in a more desirable direction. 
The mechanic in the backstreet garage cannot redesign the faulty 
engines of the cars that are brought to him; but he can tinker with them. And, 
knowing this, he develops the appropriate skills. There is the story of the 
motorist who, having tried everything he can to get hls car to start,  finally 
pushes i t  round the corner to the garage. The mechanic lifts up the bonnet, 
looks a t  the engine for a while and then, selecting a large hammer from his 
tool tray, gives it a hefty clout. "Try it  now" he says to  the owner, and it  s tarts  
first time. "How much do I owe you?" asks the delighted owner. "Ten pounds" 
says the mechanic. "Ten pounds" says the owner, his face dropping, "ten 
pounds for just hitting it with a hammer?". "Oh no" says the mechanic, "fifty 
pence for hitting it  with the hammer, nine pounds fifty for knowing where to 
hit it." 
Knowing where to hit it--that's what sustainable development is all about. 
W. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TD UNEP 
The development community does two things-i t  acts and it  thinks. The 
relationship between the two is complex but suffice it  to say that  each, to 
some extent, shapes the other. Development action, you could say, takes 
place within a conversation about developmenta  conversation that  has been 
going on for many years and that, despite the discord, the circularity and the 
eternal themes it  contains, does have a certain momentum. Currently that  
momentum is, in certain quarters, imparting more and more credibility to  the 
theme that  large-scale aid (international and governmental) is not only use- 
less but positively harmful. 
I t  is t rue that  all too often large-scale official aid ... supports inefficient 
or corrupt governments and that it is frequently spent on extravagant 
prestige projects which have little relevance to  the poor. [Brian W .  
Walker, Director General, Oxfam, Letter to  7he rimes 18 April 19831. 
Without foreign aid there is no Third World. [ ~ a u e r  and Yarney. 7he rimes 
11 April 19831. 
I a m  not convinced that  a UN agency is capable of coordinating a "new 
approach". I believe tha t  the UN agencies and big government programs 
are a large part of the  problem. [Personal communication from the head 
of a small voluntary agency.] 
Overseas aid is just a way of getting the poor people in the rich countries 
to help the  rich people in the poor countries. [Anon] 
Open season has been declared on the Big Agencies, and those of them 
desirous of avoiding extinction should devise some strategies for coping with 
this latest threat.  Perhaps the simplest solution for a Big Agency is  for i t  to  
make itself appear small and this, in fact, is precisely what the  strategic 
insights that flow from our conceptual framework suggest. 
The notion of a development process that  is open t o  constructive inter- 
vention a t  only certain points of leverage, (and. even then,  only if the inter- 
vention is institutionally appropriate) suggests tha t  both institutionally i n a p  
propriate interventions a t  these points of leverage and attempts t o  intevene a t  
other points where constructive intervention simply is not  possible, are likely 
to be positively harmful to the process. The main strategic contribution of 
this appropriate institutional approach, therefore, is a useable basis for 
separating the  useful interventions from the harmful ones. I t  provides gui- 
dance not only on what to  do but also, and more importantly, on what not to 
do. 
What this all boils down to is  a strategy that  takes i ts  shape from two com- 
mitments: the  First to  the uncovering of patterns of heterogeneity as a basis 
for a practical and local understanding; the second t o  tinkering as the only 
feasible way of intervening. Knowing where to hit  i t  is a knack that  is not 
easily acquired, and some of the pitfalls along the way to  its acquisition can be 
mapped out by a little cautionary tale--the Sahel. 
In 1977 the UN Conference on Desertification (UNCOD) 
agreed a programme to reverse the overgrazing and over- 
cultivation in the  Sahel and create green belts north and 
south of the  Sahara to halt the spread of the desert. 
A programme to  reverse these vast homogenized effects, and to throw a green 
belt around the Sahara, is a very grand design indeed. Between the  agreeing 
of a programme and its delivery, between the vast coordinated project and its 
implementation, there is often a wide abyss: 
In a 90 page report, Earthscan [I9831 blames a sequence of 
"personal and organisational antipathies" for the  failure of 
plans t o  save the Sahel, despite aid worth more than 4,000 
million pounds committed to the  region between 1975 and 
*The classic work, subtitled "How Great Ex?ecbtions in Washin~ton are Dashed in Oakland" is Wil-  
daoaky and Pressman (1073). 
1980. These frictions had "sometimes resulted in agencies 
working almost openly against one another." [This and 
preceding quote Samstag 19831. 
At first glance the idea of developing an integrated interagency approach, 
within which one agency (UNEP perhaps?) will take a central coordinating 
position, is powerfully attractive. But there are three serious objections to 
this strategic option. 
First, the  fact that  the Himalayan states sustain their autonomy by play- 
ing the agencies off, one against the other, suggests that it would be difficult 
(impossible perhaps) to achieve this desired integration and that, to the 
extent that  i t  could be achieved, it would actually be imposing dysfunction 
upon those Himalayan states-something that,  surely, must be undesirable. 
Second, integration and coordination inevitably reduce diversity, redundancy, 
duplication and overlap-the very system properties that, in a setting charac- 
terized by high levels of uncertainty, should be conserved if fragility is to be 
avoided and resilience husbanded.* Third, an integrated and coordinated 
effort, especially if one agency is to take up a central position within it, is not 
something that  can be evolved step by gradual step. It has to be large and 
complete to begin with and this means that it has to be right first time. In 
other words, learning, flexibility and opportunistic adaptation-precisely the 
approach qualities needed when the chances of getting it right first time are 
vanishingly small-would actually be ruled out by the integrated and coordi- 
nated approach. 
All tnis suggests that the integrated approach is probably impossible and 
that, even if i t  is not impossible, it is probably undesirable. At the same time, 
i t  suggests that  the "hundred UN flowers" approach is probably unavoidable 
anyway and tha t  this, far from presenting us with an intractable problem, is 
all to the good Accordingly, we urge the following strategic orientation. 
1. UNEP should resist the temptation to go for integration and coordi- 
nation in its Action Plan and should, instead, look for a distinctive 
approach tha t  will add to. rather than reduce, the multiplicity in 
approaches that already exists. 
2. The appropriate UNEP approach can be distinguished by just one 
word: instifutinns. Existing approaches, focusing on the bio-physical 
level. all seek to formulate policy by working from the environment 
to the institutions. We believe that  our conceptual framework, by 
focusing on the macro- and micro-social levels and by emphasizing 
the  uncertainties a t  the bio-physical level, will encourage the 
development of that complementary and currently neglected 
approach to  policy formulation that  s tarts  with the institutions and 
works, through them, towards the environment. 
3. In adopting this distinctive and counter-integrative approach it does 
not follow that  there is no need to  develop a consensus among the 
various UN (and other agencies) involved. But that  consensus will be ' 
achieved, not by getting all the agencies to agree to a single 
integrated approach, but by UNEP obtaining agreement (through a 
series of bilateral conversations, a s  it were) that its own distinctive 
approach complements those of all the other agencies. 
*See, for instance, Landau, (1969). 
4. We urge tha t  the  distinctiveness and initial modesty of the UNEP 
approach can best be preserved by deliberately avoiding a cornmit- 
men t  to new projects. Rather, the aim should be to draw upon the 
conceptual framework so as to learn from the  successes and failures 
of existing projects and, since learning is a two-way process, to shar- 
pen and modify that  conceptual framework in the light of what is 
discovered. 
5. By starting out small-scale and  modest, and within a relatively easily 
obtained consensus. UNEP will remain flexible, adaptive and oppor- 
tunistic. As the  approach evolves so, if i t  lives up to  the promise we 
believe i t  to  contain, resources and credibility will flow to  it. If they 
do not, then the  enterprise can be quietly abandoned, the only losses 
being the  small amounts of resources and credibility that  will, by 
then, have been committed t o  it. 
THE ACTION PLAN 
The task now is to  work up this strategic outline, with one eye all the  t ime 
on these pitfalls, so as to generate a se t  of specific proposals for an action 
plan. We do, of course, have some general thoughts on this. 
(i) We think that  UNEP should avoid too close a n  on-the-ground involvement 
in projects (after all, how could it  hope to match the sorts of skills tha t  
FAO, say, has acquired over decades of practical experience). 
(ii) Conversely. we think tha t  it  should develop a very close on-the-ground 
involvement in both project evaluation and certainty creation (this lat ter  
would draw upon the  conceptual framework to identify two sets - the  bio- 
physical facts tha t  it would be most useful to h o w  and the  bio-physical 
facts tha t  w- are  most likely to  be able to h o w .  Attention could then be 
concentrated on t h e  intersection of these sets). 
(iii) Putting these two ideas together, we begin to see UNEP as  performing a 
sort  of "merchant banker" role in the  promotion of institutional integra- 
tion by facilitation throughout the Himalayan region-organisationally 
compact. well equipped to judge between desirable and undesirable pro- 
jects, and very well informed. 
But, regrettably, we know virtually nothing about UNEP as an institution, nor 
do we know anything about the context in which i t  operates. True t o  our 
approach, we deliberately hold back from making any specific recommenda- 
tions a t  this stage. We hope tha t  these will begin to emerge from the  discus- 
sion tha t  this  paper is  designed to  promote. 
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CHAPTW 3: U N C E R T m  ON A HIMAIAYAN SCALE 
"The spiral of tragedy has taken its own route. There is suffering in 
the hills now and there will be considerably more suffering in the 
future. The Himalayas might well change completely to a semi 
desert ecology. They might not. But things will get worse before 
they get better." [Cronin 1979, p. 2221 
A complex series of interactions between man and nature in the 
Himalayan region has many experts from various disciplines speculating 
about the probable course of events in the area. The literature on the 
Himalayan "eco-crisis" is replete with descriptions of rapidly expanding hill 
populations exploiting increasingly marginal land in an attempt to produce 
more food. As agriculture is extended so the forest cover is destroyed. Ero- 
sion and landslips decrease the productivity of soil, pasture and forest. There 
are  all manner of self-reinforcing feedback loops in this system and traditional 
attempts by the farmer to better his lot or produce more food and fuel often 
lead to a worsening of the global situation in the hills and in the plains below 
[see, Eckholm 1976, Lall 19011. The lowlands are subjected to the silt and 
water run-off from the denuded land above, as well as all the attendant effects 
of migration by hill people. Because of growing populations in both the hills 
and plains, more and more people are displaced or otherwise affected by food 
and fuel shortages. changes in ground and surface water flows and mass move- 
ments of land, water and people in the area. Social unrest has also been 
increasingly intermixed with the  effects of these processes. Regional and 
international attention has been focused on this situation, and many govern- 
ments and organisations are already involved in trying to Find a solution to a 
perceived crisis. 
But describing the nature and the extent of the problem is fraught with 
complexity and uncertainty. There are  many levels of interdependent cause- 
and-effect relationships to consider in the context of extremely fluid and com- 
plicated ecological and social systems. And uncertainty has become just as 
important a feature of the  problem as any of its other attributes. 
The problem, all agree, is that  the Himalayas are  caught in a downward 
spiral. Yet, when we look a t  the key variables in current models that  attempt 
t o  define this spiral, we find that  the uncertainties are  so vast that  we cannot 
even be sure that there is a spiral. For example, the expert estimates of two 
of these key variables--the per capita fuelwood consumption rate and the sus- 
tainable yield from forest production-vary by such enormous factors that it is 
but a slight exaggeration to say that,  if the most pessimistic estimates are 
correct, the Himalayas will become as bald as a coot overnight and that, if the 
most optimistic estimates are  correct, they will shortly sink beneath the 
greatest accumulation of biomass the world has ever seen. Despite our con- 
victions as to the nature of the problem, the quantitative data can give us no 
guidance as to whether the spiral, if it indeed exists, is upward or downward.' 
Far from the problem containing some uncertainty- common enough situa- 
tion in applied science-i t  is the uncertainty that contains the  problem. The 
credible problem definitions, thanks to all this uncertainty, span such a wide 
range that it no longer makes any sense to use methods that  attempt to tune 
an already acceptable understanding of "the problem". Such a tunable under- 
standing is possible only when the problem contains some uncertainty; i t  sim- 
ply does not exist in the Himalayas. 
Another way of talking about this switch from tunable to untunable prob- 
lem that  accompanies such a marked increase in the scale of uncertainty is to 
say that as we go from the one situation to the other so we go from science to 
trans-sciace [Weinberg 19721. Trans-science is the science of messes, and 
the most important thing for the  scientist who ventures into this region is 
that he be aware that he is entering it. This is because the tried-and-true 
methods that have long served him so well in situations that  involve some 
messiness simply cannot be relied on to support him when he finds himself in 
a situation where there is nothing but mess. I t  is our contention that  the  
Himalayas currently constitute such a region and that  the scientists who have 
ventured into it have failed to switch across to the methods appropriate to 
trans-science. Furthermore, since these scientists have entered the region a t  
the behest of policymakers, there has been a knock-on effect and the  policy 
formulations generated by this inappropriate science have been similarly 
flawed. Our argument, therefore, proceeds in two stages. Firstly, a critical 
stage in which we show that the Himalayas are currently well inside the  realm 
of trans-science and that  both research and policy formulation, having failed 
to concede this, have been inappropriately conceived. Secondly. a construc- 
tive stage in which we try to develop the methods and the policy implications 
appropriate to the trans-scientific realm. 
CISSCIENCE AND TRANSSCLENCE 
Policy issues can be approached in two ways. You can ask "what are the  
facts?" and you can ask "what would you like the facts to  be?". In a situation 
where there is already considerable certainty about the facts (and especially 
where there is a good prospect of increasing that certainty even Further) the  
sensible approach is by way of the first question. A s  the noose of certainty is 
tightened so those who are advocating policies that,  to be justified. would 
require the facts to be other than they are will be forced to abandon either 
their positions or their credibility. But in a situation where there  is wide 
uncertainty about the facts (and especially where there is little prospect of 
*In circumstances such as this the traditional engineering response is to switch across to qualita- 
tive data-not just m y  qualitative data but qualitative data supported by the wealth of experience 
of those rho provide it. 
There seem to be little practical advantage in quantiiylng by sophisticeted statistics 
the gap between tbe fuel needs and the available resources of firewood, for to anyone 
familiar with the region over a number of decades it is obvious that the hill forests are 
shrhkiugin some areas more rapidly than in otbers-and that the needs of the popu- 
lation can no longer be met from the remaining forests, [von Fuerer-Haimendorf 1883, 
personal communication]. 
The engineer, you might say, switches to qualitative data and acts; the scienkst sticks to quantifi- 
cation and ncommenda more research. 
decreasing that uncertainty) the sensible approach is by way of the second 
question. If those who are advocating the various rival policies can all justify 
their policies without losing their credibility then they will simply stick to 
those positions. Here, in contrast to the first situation in which the problem 
contains some uncertainty, the noose is so loose that  the  relationship is the  
other way round and it is the uncertainty tha t  contains the problem. This 
means that, try as you may, you cannot determine who is "right". But you can 
still do something-you can gain some understanding of why the  varioils advo- 
cates take up their various positions. 
When the noose of certainty is loose we are  in the  realm of trans-science 
and, as  i t  tightens, we move across into the realm of what we are accustomed 
to call science but which, if we are going to be following policy issues back and 
forth across this divide, we should get used to calling c is -sc ience .  That way we 
can give equal status to each-they are just two k inds  of s c i e n c e a n d  we can 
concentrate on the different methods and modes of enquiry tha t  a re  appropri- 
ate to  each. Since cis-science is quite familiar to us, i t  is the  methods and 
modes of enquiry that  go with trans-science that  will appear strange; and none 
stranger, perhaps, than the  sociology of p e r c e p t i o n  (by which is included the  
history, philosophy and sociology of science and the  sociology of everyday 
knowledge*) and that has to do with the institutional forces that  confer and 
withdraw credibility. 
A science, i t  is often said, has reached maturity when i t  can afford t o  
ignore its history but this comforting idea of an irreversible progression--for 
instance, from natural history to the various biological and earth sciences-is  
currently being undermined by the emergence of forest historians, risk his- 
torians, climate historians ... carbon historians in response to such pressing 
and largely trans-scientific problems as "the greenhouse effect" and the  whole 
question of the  sustainable development of the  biosphere. This distinction 
between (and even-handed legitimation of) cis-science and trans-science does 
not do away with the notion of scientific progress but i t  does reject the  idea 
that  it is always in the  same direction. Cis-science, one could say, progresses 
by ignoring its history; trans-science cannot ge t  along without it. Each has i t s  
part to play in the  advancement of science. We are  not opposed to cis-science; 
we are  opposed to  its misuse. 
IS THERE A SPIRAL? 
Analysis in te rms of physical facts--the appropriate method of cis- 
science--has first to identify all the components of the  Himalayan system and 
all the connections between those components. The result is a qualitative 
model made up of numerous labelled boxes, tha t  represent the  components of 
the system, connected together by a web of labelled arrows representing t h e  
dynarnical processes that,  in t o t o ,  sustain o r  transform the  system. Before 
you can tell whether this system is being sustained or transformed (and, if t h e  
latter,  the  direction of tha t  transformation) you need to  know the  relative 
rates of all these processes. At the very least, you will need to  know the ra tes  
of those tha t  can clearly be seen to be the  key variables of the system. Uncer- 
tainty can enter  into this analysis a t  several points. You may not have identi- 
fied all the components of your complex system. you may not have identified 
all the  dynamic processes that  link those components, you may not have iden- 
tified the  key variables correctly and, lastly, you may not have achieved a 
*This is the definition provided by M a r y  Douglas (1083). 
sufficiently accurate measurement  of the  rates  of these key variables. The 
Himalayas notch up impressively high scores on all of these possible sources 
of uncertainty. 
For example, in trying to understand how fast the  forested area  is 
changing--one of the  most important characteristics of t he  ecological s t ruc-  
ture  of the  region-you must  first understand the pressures on the forest 
resource. O n e  of the  most significant demands is the  need for fuelwood by 
farmers. In Nepal, farmers make up about 95% of the  population, and it has 
been calculated (by the  Energy Research and Development Group a t  Tribhuvan 
University, Kathmandu, Nepal), tha t  about 95% of all wood taken from the  
forest is destined for use as fuelwood. ?Jot only this, but t he  same group has 
estimated tha t  about 87% of total energy consumption for the whole country is 
in the form of fuelwood. Most at tempts  to  quantify the  impact of this factor 
have depended upon measuring the p e r  capita r a t e  of f i e l w o o d  c o n s u m p t i o n .  
This, according to the  prevalent models, is one of t he  most crucial variables 
for understanding the  whole system* and many authors  have used estimates 
of this r a t e  to  demonstrate t h e  environmental impact of a growing population 
that  must  (they assume) depend on the  land for meeting its subsistence 
needs. 
A survey of est imates  of this nationwide rate in  Nepal [Dpfovan 1981. No. 
141 ov r the  last  26 years has  revealed a range from O.lm (or 60 Kg.) t o  5 6.67m (or 4000 Kg.) per capita per annum-quantities separated by a factor of 
67. Even when the  two upper outliers are  deleted (one of which may be a rnis- 
print)" we a re  still left with a range tha t  differs by a factor of 26. Though t h e  
estimates do seem to cluster arounli t h e  1 cubic met re  level, Donovan's inves- 
tigation of t h e  range  of expert opinion is very instructive for those trying to  
assemble previous research data on the Himalayan region. Uncertainty of this 
magnitude on a crucial system variable i s  quite r a re  in the systems with 
which we a re  familiar. Even the vast uncertainties associated with estimating 
oil and gas reserves [Schanz 1978 and Wildavsky and Tenenbaurn 1981] pale 
into insignificance when compared with this. And, in the  case of fuelwood con- 
sumption, there is a t  least something t ha t  can be measured; in oil and gas 
reserves estimation there is nothing!'** 
*Assuming, of course, that the forests are being perceived and treated as a r s ~ w a b l o  resource 
within that system. If they are being perceived and treated as a convsTtibLo resource3 orested 
land into agricultural or grazing or building land--then this variable becomes much less crucial 
and the conversion rate becomes the key variable. This deep uncertainty as to which of these is 
the key variable in the Himalayas is discussed further in the section headed Sbme Chdibls fir- 
qpectivos. 
**Donovan (op.cit. p. 4) makes the following observation: 
On page 144 of Rieger e t  al., under the section entitled "Forest Administration in Practice", 
the authors report that according to  the "Divisional Forest Offices ... firewood demand is 50 
bundles per family per yea?. Possibly then the authors' subsequent estimate on page 152 of 
"per capita annual fuel consumption ... (of) 5&100 bundles of 40 kilograms each" is a mi* 
print. 
The fact that it simply is not possible to figure out whether or not this is a rniaprint is, perhaps, the 
most telling indication of all that the uncertainty contains the problem. 
***The scientific guesswork in oil and gas reserves estimation is "... akin to  going to an unfamiliar 
supermarket on a foggy night and trying to  estimate t'ne total amount of asphalt used jn ~1aving the 
parking lot with no other data than a cubic inchpample of the blacktop used." [Schanz p. 3331 
CHALLENGES TO QUANTIFICATION 
Such gross and persistent uncertainty, around something tha t  is instrin- 
sically measurable, demands some expianation. What obstacles, self-imposed 
and external, have got in the way of the fuelwood consumption estimators? 
The answers form a sad and familiar litany. 
"All too often visiting consultants have neglected to explain the  
methods used to arrive a t  their expert opinions ... some estimates 
have been boldly quoted and requoted, often without citation, in ever 
more respectable documents, until a very casually contrived esti- 
mate has become the  basis for policy formation and program plan- 
ning." [Donovan 1981, No. 14, pp. 5 and 141 
Donovan's own investigation into fuelwood use in the commercial sector 
sheds some more Light on the  uncertainty of figures related to  resource con- 
sumption in the  Himalayan region. Much information is gathered by asking 
local people how much they use. 
"... sometimes we felt the  reply given was more socially or politically 
desirable than correct. At times there appeared to be an effort t o  
present a facade of modernity; a few individuals preferred to guess 
weight, volume, or  distance in international units rather  than t o  
report what they probably knew with greater  confidence in tradi- 
tional units ... Volume t o  weight ratios often vary from village to vil- 
lage, region to region and season to season. Time and distance are 
two additional variables presenting measurement problems, espe- 
cially in a country where the average inhabitant does not own a time- 
piece and has little use for ldlometers or miles". [Donovan 1980, No. 
D, p. 51 
On top of these difficulties in collecting data where book-keeping is prac- 
tically non-existent, and where (as anyone who has travelled in the  Himalayas 
knows to  his cost) people always try to give the answer they think you would 
like to  hear, there are some other powerful forces a t  work shaping the  d a t a  
"... a universal dread of the  tax collector appeared to  hinder our 
at tempts t o  secure accurate production and revenue data ... 
Although not  a s  sensitive an issue as the  more popular survey topics 
of family planning and Farm management, the  study focus on wood- 
fuel utilization did give rise to some degree of apprehension among 
those individuals questioned. Due t o  the rapid deterioration of 
Nepal's national forests during the last decade, the  consumption of 
firewood and charcoal recently has come under scrutiny by govern- 
ment  officials. In some districts where forest preserves have been 
established, local villagers now must obtain special permits t o  cu t  
wood in areas which once were their common fuelshed; in Surkhet 
valley townspeople who have access t o  government fuel depots a r e  
denied such permits. Government forest regulations subject to  
enforcement by an  inadequate, ill-equipped staff of field officers have 
had only limited success, however, in halting forest destruction. To 
our questions regarding forest utilization, I often felt informants 
gave a politically appropriate response rather  than actual fact. Many 
times individuals were hesitant to name their suppliers or  geographi- 
cal source. In several instances we were told t o  return a t  dawn if we 
wanted to talk with  the  charcoal producers. Fearful of government 
surveillance these people carry their loads into the cities and towns 
under the cover of early morning darkness". [Donovan 1980, No. 9, p. 
8 I 
It is indeed difficult to gather factually accurate information under these 
circumstances. We say "factzuzUy accurate information" because, of course. 
the information that  is gathered does quite accurately reflect the various 
social forces that are at  work in the Himalayas. In this sense, i t  is i n s t i t u t i o n -  
a U y  accurate and. as we shall argue later, perhaps institutional accuracy is 
more valuable (and more accessible) than factual accuracy. Though "proper" 
research methods are supposed to control sources OF bias such as these, they 
have clearly met their match in the Himalayas. But, even assuming that  the 
information that  has been gathered can be controlled for bias, it still has to be 
assembled into a conceptual framework that is consistent with the context 
from which it was derived. and herein lies the next obstacle. 
CHALLENGES TO CONCEPTUAL124 TION 
When trying to fit a factor such as per capita fuelwood consumption into a 
quantitative causal model of impact on forest resources, the  "consumption" 
concept is often used as a proxy for "demand" or "need" in order to provide a 
gross measure of pressure on resources. This is probably a better proxy than 
many arbitrary guesses, but i t  has been noted that there are sometimes 
extreme variations in fuelwood use in relation to  region [Donovan 1901, No. 
141, availability [FA0 19741, season [Kawikita 19791, foodgrain availability and 
farm management styles [Bajracharya 19801. People do not just h a v e  needs; 
they manage them. They use more wood when it is easier to get and less when 
it is more difficult to get.* And, even when a number is put on a concept such 
as per capita fuelwood consumption, the reseacher, focusing on numbers 
alone. "may lose sight of their context, and thus, their relevance and reason- 
ableness". [Donovan 1981, No. 14, p. 141. The generalization of a locally 
derived figure is often unwarranted. and i t  often does not have any signifi- 
cance as a behaviour indicator under slightly different circumstances. 
Nonetheless. many numbers, we find, are treated in just this manner. 
"Firewood is used a t  a rate of 546.3 Kg. per capita per annum in 
Nepal. The estimated sustainable yield of firewood production from 
Nepalese forests is only 77.9 Kg. per capita per annum (1978). This 
represents a loss to the nation of 6.5 million tons of wood a year. 
With firewood scarce and expensive, the Nepalese are  beginning to  
use dried animal manure for fuel, which results in lowered fertility 
on fields tha t  previously were fertilized with manure. In addition, 
fewer people are  boiling their drinking water, and eating hot meals 
because fuel is too precious. This leads to greater  health problems 
because of poor nutrition and contaminated water." [Library of 
Congress 1979, p. 391 
Besides expanding on the logical consequences of fuel shortage, this 
sounds very authoritative and precise. But not only is there no feeling for the 
uncertainty of the consumption figure, and its local contexts. there is also no 
mention of the  inherent assumptions of forest productivity or even forest area 
*For instance, von FuererHaimendorf (1875) has reported that when he was fimt in the Khumbu 
reeon (in 1857) every house kept a fire going all the time but that when he revisited the area (in 
1873) they were oniy lit for coaling. This must represent a saving of at least a tnird and indicates 
that the Sherpa fuelwood consumption rate is highly elastic. 
which led to the 77.9 Kg. per capita per year figure for "sustainable y ie ld  of 
firewood. + 
Indeed, the very definition of what constitutes "forest" (and other 
resource inventory classifications) adds still more confusion and technical 
uncertainty to the understanding of what is happening in the Himalayan 
region. Those who have taken the trouble to look in both places know that a 
forest on a bureaucrat's map is not always the same thing as a forest on the 
ground 
"In fact, even in the  protected forest area, one finds considerable 
tracts of small shrub ... i t  is not uncomman to find vast areas of open 
ground which support only shrubs although they were formerly 
forested and are still counted as forests in official statistics because 
of unrecorded deforestation." [Parikh 1977, p. 19741 
"Published national forestry statistics are often misleading. They 
usually cover only those wooded areas officially designated as forest 
lands by governments and even the figures for those areas are some- 
times grossly doctored. The United Nations reseachers carrying out 
the 1963 World Forestry Inventory discovered that  as much as half 
the area reported as 'forest land' in many countries was also labelled 
'unstocke8--generally a euphemism for partially or wholly denuded 
lands on which reforestation remains a hypothetical prospect." [Eck- 
holm 1976. p. 371 
Because of this data problem, it is often difficult to assemble a picture of 
regional land use patterns, or  to even make intelligent estimates of potential 
forest production, because you need to know how much forest there is to do 
that. ++ 
Fuelwood consumption and supply, of course, is only one aspect of the 
Himalayan people-and-resources system and we should now move on to see 
whether the spectacular levels of uncertainty that surround it apply else- 
where in the system. 
*A cursory investigation of "susteinable yield" caiculations reveals that different forests grow at 
different rates, and that even the same sorts of forests grow at different rates in different areas. 
Yield calculations often involve the multiplication of several estimated quantities such as foreat 
area, forest density, and average growth ra tes  E m r a  made in any  one of these values are com- 
pounded in the product. Taking the value of "forest growth" alone, i t  is not surprising that dif- 
ferent method logies and slmple areas have produced estimates of "forest growth" varying from 3 less than 0.2m /hectare/yr (1876 Tribhuvan University study far areas near villages) through the 
1978 World Bank Fbrrstqj 4 tor Ruvisw for Nepal which reports forest growth at 5 0.8m3/hF/yr.. through 12.5m ihectare/yr (Levenson 1970) through Wormwald's 1978 reporta 
of 1530m /hectare/yr for areas in west central Nepal. 
*.Satellite remote aensing s tukes may now be helping to resolve t h s  difficulty, but ground truth 
tests and detaiied sumeps are still in their early stages. 
FROM MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS TO CAUSAL UNCERTAINTY 
Data derived horn survey questionnaires can often be deceptive. The 
statistics used t o  quantify agricultural production and associated land-use 
pat terns have been investigated by a team from the Research Centre for Nepal 
and Asian Studies a t  Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu. 
"In a study of the  reliability of single visit surveys in Nepal, i t  was 
found that  error on crop yields exceeded 180% for more than 20% of 
the  farms ... (for all farms, 54% of the households reported errone- 
ously their land holdings, with a n  average error of 240% ...). In a 
separate study, it was also found tha t  80% of the respondents did not 
fully understand the questions they were asked t o  answer ... These 
results which vary from village to village point to  the fact that  non- 
sampling errors are greater than sampling errors." [uNDP 1980. p. 
271 
Further technical uncertainty is encountered in analysing the human 
components of erosion, flooding and shifting hydrological patterns. Since only 
tha t  part  of a process tha t  is caused by human agency can be altered by alter- 
ing human behaviour, the whole question of how much of the damage inflicted 
by these processes is due to  human activity in the  hills and how much is due 
t o  events which would occur whether man  were present or not has become 
increasingly important to policy makers. 
In a paper presented at a seminar on the Himalayan region, several geolo- 
gists agreed: 
"The tectonic stresses which heaved up these mighty ranges in the  
recent  past have not completely died down as yet, and provide addi- 
tional impetus and vigour for the dynamic processes. These 
processes are manifested by intense seismic activity, floods, and 
mass  wastage observed in this region." [Department of Science and 
Technology, Government of India 1978, p. 91 
Obviously, flooding and erosion a re  part of the  natural Himalayan environ- 
ment.  In the  flooding case, the policy relevant question has become: how are  
these massive floods related to  the  land-use activities of upstream people and 
has the problem become more serious in recent  years because of upstream 
deforestation? [The following description is not intended to  minimize the  
importance of forests in highland/lowland hydrologic systems but ra ther  t o  
give a sense of a more complex relationship than is  usually assumed.] 
Upstream deforestation has been repeatedly, and categorically, labelled 
as  a cause of catastrophic flooding. 
"The major common factor is the  increasing darnage to the lowland 
agriculture of India, Pakistan and Nepal by floods loaded with debris 
from misused high altitude watersheds. These floods are due t o  
increasing populations of subsistence farmers on steep mountain 
slopes in remote areas." [Pereira 1981, p. 31 
And. in much the same vein: 
"In 1979, India suffered $2 billion in property damage and numerous 
lives in the  Ganges Valley in part because of deforestation in north- 
e r n  India and Nepal." [Cultural Survival Quarterly 1982. p. 31 
But, in a monsoon-dominated climate, even forested watersheds can lose 
much of their protective effect when they become saturated. A study [Ross 
19821 by a weather observer (Russell Ambrosiac of NOAA) has revealed that the 
weather pattern associated with the 1978-79 record floods of the Ganges 
released most of its moisture on fo res ted  land. If a heavy storm strikes when 
the 'sponge' is already full (a common enough situation during the monsoon) 
most of that precipitation will become run-off, there will be little buffering 
effect, and catastrophic floods will ensue. So it is oversimplistic to say that 
protection of forests in highland watersheds will put an end to flooding in the 
plains. 
The bulk of the Himalayan literature paints a picture of increasing run-off 
from deforested slopes leading to ever increasing flood damage in the low- 
lands. It is actually very difficult to document whether catastrophic flooding 
is more serious now than before simply because flood damage statisti, -S are 
usually published in monetary terms, and "flood damage" is bound to increase 
along with increasing population and associated development in floodplain 
areas.. 
"It is true that mountain torrents have increased as a result of 
deforestation, but with widespread flooding, the connection has not 
been very well documented. The upstream problems alone justify 
reforestation projects, but if you try to justify them on the basis of 
downstream flooding, that could be vulnerable ground." [Eckholm 
19821 
The academic research community has prepared a whole battery of ongo- 
ing research projects to try and answer the question of how much human 
activities contribute to flooding and erosion [e.g. UNESCO 1977, p. 281 but, in 
the meantime, the linkage between upstream deforestation and downstream 
flooding is a key policy consideration in the Himalayan region because 
"upstream causes" are often located in one country and "downstream effects" 
in another. The number of people who are affected is also an important con- 
sideration in this international framework because this number provides an 
initial guideline for the priority of disbursement of financial assistance to 
nations and organisations ~ t h  interests in the region. In this economic and 
institutional context i t  is interesting to note the points emphasized by the 
Nepalese Ambassador to the United States, (Nepal is heavily dependent on 
foreign loans and grants) and by the international academic community con- 
cerned with scientific research in the Himalayan region (financed largely by 
UN organisations). 
When asked if deforestation in the hills of Nepal led to catastrophic flood- 
ing in India, the Nepalese Ambassador replied, "It is obvious there is a very 
clear and direct link" [Thapa 19821. This perfectly legitimate position (given 
the current uncertainty) provides one more item in the list of justifications 
for the channelling to Nepal of increased financial assistance out of proportion 
to its own population. Likewise, all the academic experts who participated in 
the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Activity in Southern Asian Mountain Sys- 
tems in Kathmandu adopted the statement: 
*And also with increasing disbursements, by government and international agencies, of flood dam- 
age compensation and relief. See Kurwuther (1989) for an account of how this has happened in 
the US. 
"Although only about 40 million people live in the Hindu Kush 
Himalayan mountain lands, about 350 million live in adjacent large 
river basins and plains, and are seriously affected by conditions in 
the mountain areas." [UNESCO 1977, p. 151 
Flooding figured prominently in their list of effects and, since so many people 
were affected, the participants (again, quite legitimately) concluded that this 
was one more reason why further research should be funded to study moun- 
tain problems. So the experts are  just as busy assigning salience to the data 
in response to their institutional pressures as are the hill farmers, the arnbas- 
sadors, and anyone else with a stake in the region. In other words, they are  
biased. 
The "hard" scientist may find such a conclusion discouraginginsulting, 
even--but the sociologist of science sees it all in a more encouraging and, 
complimentary Light. First, i t  shows that  the " h a r d  scientist is only human 
and, second, i t  helps to  reveal the patterns of institutional forces that  sustain 
both the  polarized positions of the various stakeholders and the wide uncer- 
tainty that  allows them to legitimately take up those different positions. At  
the same time, i t  gives some clues as to why this uncertainty is so gross and 
so persistent. Uncertainty, we begin to  realise, is not just the absence of cer- 
tainty but, rather, a positive thing in its own right--something that  can be 
socially generated and socially imposed in order to protect the Legitimacy of 
established institutions and to prevent that  legitimacy from being eroded by a 
creeping tide of certainty. Just as i t  would be naive to expect lawyers to tidy 
up the law, or the police to eradicate crime, so we should not place too much 
faith in the ability of " h a r d  science to tell us what the facts in the Himalayas 
really are. 
CRTSIS OR NO CRISIS? 
A great deal has been written about the  accelerated ecological deteriora- 
tion in the Himalayan region. Most of i t  centres on the critical nature of the 
"crisis". One view which stands out like a sore thumb is that of a former US 
Peace Corps Director in India who, in 1981, went back to the Khumbu region of 
Nepal which he had not revisited since his initial trip there in 1950. Instead of 
reporting critical deforestation and deterioration of the Sherpa lifestyle as  is 
the usual custom in that  area  [e-g. Lall e t  al. 1981, Coppock 1978) he said 
that, with the exception of a thicket of dwarf juniper a t  Pheriche, there was 
"as much or more forest cover than there was in 1950 and I have the pictures 
to  prove it." As for the Sherpas, he  felt they "were better off and happier today 
than they were thirty years ago." Though he said he could only speak authori- 
tatively about Khumbu, he  felt that  the whole question of "1s there really a 
problem that  is more serious today than 30 years ago?" is gn important one to 
consider. [Houston 19821 
Houston, in questioning the very existence of the crisis, has thrown his 
cap into the ring in much the  same way that some bold spirits in the US have 
seriously questioned the existence there of an energy crisis. All we are con- 
cerned with a t  this stage is to  se t  the seal upon our argument that the uncer- 
tainty contains the problem by showing that even the existence of the crisis 
itself is open to  doubt, but we will presently return to this particular 
challenge-the status of the Khumbu forests-and attempt some sort of resolu- 
tion to  it. 
FROM FUZZY PHYSICAL FACTS TO THE POLITICS OF POLARIZED PERCEPTIOR'S 
Whilst this quick survey of uncertainty has not touched on many impor- 
tant aspects of the Himalayan system (it has not, for instance, gone into what 
happens to the key variables when the forest is viewed as a convertible rather 
than a renewable resource) it has served to draw attention to a few parts of 
that  system where viewpoints, and hence problem definitions, can vary. 
There are many individuals, organisations and governments that have 
become intimately involved in different aspects of the development challenges 
faced by the people of the Himalayan region, and each of them approaches the 
situation with a distinctive perspec t ive4  perspective that is shaped by insti- 
tutional structures and by past experience. Yet one of the most important 
perspectives in the whole system-that  of the individual hill farmer himself- 
seldom gains entry to this arena. The reason is two-fold. First, the inappropri- 
ate cis-science approach. dealing in physical facts not socially induced per- 
ceptions, cannot make room for him. Second, the hill farmer. lacking recog- 
nizable political or economic power, cannot force his way in. True, the hill 
farmer is often described, and a token place accorded to  him, but, in a world 
where international balances of power are wavering, where internal political 
stability in a number of Himalayan countries is being eroded, and where the 
positions of economic and academic elites are always a t  stake, this viewpoint 
and its connection with the land that is actually threatened receive lowest 
priority. 
The "carrying capacity" of this land, despite the cis-science insistence to 
the contrary, is not simply "given" by its bio-physical properties and by the 
state of the technology that is brought to bear on it. I t  must be locally per- 
ceived and interacted with. The local perception of the ecological situation is 
of extreme importance to any policy design, and as Edward Cronin has said "to 
the villager's mind, the problem is not one of too many people but merely not 
enough food" [Cronin 1979, p. 2161. This locally generated problem definition 
it must be stressed is not the  result of a "misperception" on the  part of the  
hill Earmer; it is deeply embedded in a particular cultural context and strongly 
buttressed by all sorts of local institutional supports. That is why it 's credible 
to  him. The policy maker who, for much the same sorts of cultural and insti- 
tutional reasons, finds himself committed to the opposite problem 
definition-too many people-is being hopelessly optimistic if he expects the 
hill farmer to realign his perception once the "real" situation has been 
revealed to him, a ~ d  he  is being hopelessly unrealistic if he expects to  be able 
to  push his policies through in the face of this perceptual mismatch.. 
*The policy maker, of course, will try to subsume the villager's problem definition within his own 
by pointing out that there is not enough food because there are too many people. But the villager 
does not make this connection. The fact is that, over the yeers, his seemingly inadequate problem 
definition has served him very well; i t  has, you could say, provided the strategic underpinning for 
optimal migration. If there used to be enough food, and now there is not, then move on! 
People have always sloshed about in the Himalayas, leaving places where the opportunities 
have declined and going to places where they are opening up. Population density is  a very poor in- 
dicator of opportunity (mu of its direction of change) nor is it something that is directly perceiv- 
able by the villager; hunger is an excellent, and readily perceived, indicator. (Its greet drawback is 
that, by perpetuating the equation of land with wealth, it does not indicate those oppor?unities 
that ere opened up by the severing of that equation.) Of course, it rill be objected that this stra- 
tegy is no longer viable because the population everywhere has increased to such an extent that 
there are no longer any opportunities left anywhere. Ths, as we will show, simply is not true. The 
strategy is not obsolete but i t  does need updating (particuJarly in its interaction with the other 
atrategg--the "adventurous tradei' stretegy-that opens up the opportunities that it ignores). 
Nor is this local perception, crucial though it always is, everywhere the 
same. Whilst Cronin's succinct characterization of "the villagers mind" fits 
well enough with the institutional supports that  sustain the "cautious cultiva- 
tor" strategy, i t  does not fit a t  all well with the very different institutional s u p  
ports that sustain the "adventurous trader" strategy. That is, not only is local 
perception a key consideration in the design of effective policy, but that local 
perception itself varies dramatically from one locality to another. The 
tragedy of the classic ("what are the facts?") approach is that, by according 
the hill farmer just a token place in the arena, i t  commits itself to viewing the 
Himalayas as one enormous homogenised smear: "the hill farmer", "the 
villager's mind", "t fhe sustainable yield", "the per capita fuelwood consumption 
rate" ... "the carrying capacity". But the Himalayas are not like that a t  all. 
The state of empirical knowledge, patchy though i t  is, tells us that more 
trees are being cut  down in some areas than in others, and that the same sort 
of variation holds for the soil that is indeed washing down the rivers, and for 
the population that  is indeed increasing, but these relative rates and their sig- 
nificance have defied all attempts a t  global "objective" analysis. That there is 
a problem is difficult to  dispute but there are tremendous local variations in 
its manifestations and, more importantly, in its perception. In the Himalayas 
the ultimate clients of any programme of sustainable development are aston- 
ishingly diverse, and the interrelationships between all the brokers of 
economic and political power flows are remarkably complex. This is the arena 
in which data are being collected, models constructed, and projects launched. 
There is great technical uncertainty and the quality of the data reflects this 
but, even more importantly, different people are approaching the situation 
with different perceptions and with different ambitions. 
The Himalayas may be poor in natural resources but they are extraordi- 
narily rich in institutional v a r i e t y i n  contradictory perceptions, in multiple 
problem definitions, in plural rationalities and in contending prescriptions- 
something which, alas, the  classic approach, with its homogenising a s sump  
tions and its inappropriate cis-science- methods, is ill-equipped to handle. 
Perhaps the greatest single justification for the trans-science approach. and 
for its central preoccupation with institutions and credibility, is the simple 
recognition: where there's heterogeneity there's hope. This does not mean 
that there is no place for cis-science in the Himalayas; only that, at present, 
much of it is misplaced and misapplied. The essential heterogeneity of the  
region is precisely what the cis-science data c a p t u r e s i t  makes sense of 
specific localized contexts. To then go and generalise that  data across the 
region is simply to throw away all the understanding that  it contains and to  
generate from i t  not policies but platitudes. 
THE KHUMBU FORESTS Rl2'YISSITED 
It is worth pausing here  for a moment to  show how Houston's perception 
and the perceptions of those who argue for the existence of the crisis can be 
reconciled. a major strand in our argument is that cis-science is a t  
present being misused, we should t r y  t o  say more precisely what this misuse 
consists of. There are,  i t  seems to us, two urges (both of which have their 
institutional origin a t  the  macro level of international bureaucracy and sci- 
ence) that should have been resisted. The first is the urge to generalise 
locally valid data across the region. The second is the urge to quantify what 
appear, from this lofty viewpoint, to be the key variables of the syskem. 
Of course, the Khurnbu forests are not at  all typical--they are a t  a high 
altitude in a region that  is not densely populated--and the forests that are 
causing most concern are those that extend (or used to extend) from the Mid- 
dle Ranges down into the Terai. But, even so, we can use the example of the  
Khumbu forests to  explain what we mean about the misuse of cis-science and 
to show the sort of progress that  can be made by developing a sensitivity to  
contexts and by drawing upon the largely qualitative data of trained observers 
who have detailed and often long-term experience of a particular locality. 
On his second visit to Khurnbu (in 1973), Fiirer-Haimendorf found that  
fires were lit only for cooking whereas, on his first visit (in 1957), they had 
been kept going all the waking hours. This must represent a fuelwood saving 
of a t  least a third and indicates that,  sometime between 1957 and 1973, some- 
thing happened to fuelwood supply. What? The forest productivity could not 
suddenly have changed, and the population did not suddenly increase. Nor is 
it very likely that  this was the  sudden cumulative result of gradual long-term 
misuse. The fact that  the Sherpas had been living in Khumbu for 400 years or  
so without destroying the forest pretty well rules that  out. One explanation 
that is sometimes advanced is that  the  increase in mountaineering and tour- 
ism had placed an excessive pressure on the forest resource but this, on 
closer inspection, does not bear up either. 
Trekkers' permits are  checked a t  Namche police station and in 1977 there 
were about 5,000 recorded.* Since trekkers have been increasing rapidly year 
by year, the total must  have been considerably less in 1973 when Haimendorf 
noticed the drastic reduction in fuelwood consumption. But, even if we take 
this high figure and assume that each trekker spends a fortnight in the area, 
we obtain an increase of only around 200 man-years consumption as against a 
saving of 1/3 x the  permanent population (which has long remained fairly con- 
stant a t  about 2.200). Since this works out a t  roughly 700 man-years of con- 
sumption (at  the old rate) f o r egone4  sum that  comfortably swamps the  
increased demand resulting from tourism-we must look elsewhere for an 
explanation.** 
For 400 years the Sherpas were able to burn as much wood as they wanted 
and then suddenly, between 1957 and 1973, they had to cut back drastically. If 
i t  was not the tourists and i t  was not population increase, what was it? Well, in 
the 1950's the forests were nationalized. Management was taken out of local 
hands and transferred to  central gove rnmen t4  reform which, we h o w ,  des- 
troyed the indigenous management system that had worked successfully for 
centuries and then did not  work itself. Once this had happened the gentle 
controls were off and people began to take too much wood from the nearby 
forest and not enough from further away. The thicket of dwarf juniper a t  
Pheriche disappeared and so too, by Haimendorfs account, did some other 
areas of forest close t o  the villages and the trekking routes. But, on the  other 
hand. Houston too is largely correct in that vast tracts of forest some distance 
from the villages and trekking routes are still intact. Indeed, large fallen 
trees lie rotting within them. I€ this is the case-if it is not a lack of forest but 
a lack of control of forest--then the solution is  a temporary moratorium on 
taking wood from the  nearby forest, and the best means of effectively doing 
this is probably a revival of the  system of village forests and forest guardians 
*This section is based on Thompson's fieldwork notes during a visit to Khumbu in 1877 to study the 
personal risk-handling strategies of Sherpas involved in mountaineering. 
*.0f course, there is also the spin-off-the cooks, porters and so on who accompany some of these 
trekkers. But the Tsmang, Rai (or whatever) portem usually get replaced by Sherpa (and/or y&s) 
once a trek reaches Khumbu, in which case the spin-off effect is comparatively slight. 
backed up, if need be, by the  sanctions that the local Everest National Park 
staff are already empowered by central government to  exercise. At  the same 
time, both institutions can  probably collaborate in replanting the  bits of forest 
that  have disappeared and in enforcing the regulations tha t  require trekkers 
to be self-sufficient in fuel (e.g. gas or  kerosene) once they enter  the  park. 
So here is a plausible, and testable, explanation of what has been happen- 
ing to the Khumbu forests+--an explanation tha t  closely relates such data as 
exist to their context, that  makes use of detailed local observation, that  incor- 
porates such historical facts and trends as are known, and that,  by respecting 
the integrity of both Houston and those that  he criticises, is able to zero in 
onto the sort  of fine-grained and critical shifts in collective resource manage- 
ment  that  alone can tell us what is wrong and what needs to  be done to put it  
right. 
Of course this is  a very tentative explanation and prescription. based on 
just a few field studies that ,  moreover, were not even directed a t  the  question 
of forest use,*+ but,  even so, i t  serves to highlight the meaninglessness of 
such generalisations as the  per capita fuelwood consumption ra te  and the 
absurdity of the sort  of premature quantification tha t  tries to  tell us tha t  
Nepal is losing 6.5 million tons of wood a year. 
11. GFTLTNG TO GRIPS WlTH UNCEXTAINTY 
The wide uncertainty surrounding Himalayan deforestation provides us 
with a wide choice of problems. We could, if we were so minded, simply choose 
the problem best suited t o  our approach and discard the rest;  but that. of 
course, would mean claiming that  that  was the  real  problem and that  all the  
others were unreal. If we want to preserve what is real about all these 
problems--the uncertainty a s  to which, i f  any, of them is the  real problem- 
then we have to t r ea t  the  problem we choose simply as a point of entry: a way 
of opening up and exploring the complex physical, social and cultural system 
that  is currently generating all this uncertainty. Since this whole idea of put- 
ting the  problems inside t h e  uncertainty runs so counter to  the established 
*An additional factor in the breakdown of the control system may be the partial erosion of the tuo 
great stabilizing ideals of Sherpa life; the proper utilization of acquired wealth and the cultivaticm 
of courtesy, gentleness and a spirit of compromise and peacefulness. Both Sherpa business in- 
volvement in Kathmandu and central government's involvement in the local affaim of Khumbu 
contribute to  this erosion. 
** Much mare data of this type i s  now available. There is the experience of the National Park r a p  
dens (e.g. Jefferies 1082), and of the leaders of the two hydro-electric projects in Khumbu (e.g. Hin- 
richsen e t  d. 1883 and Coburn 1883). Recently there have been detailed studies of how fuelwood is 
used in Namche village (Adam Stem) m d  of how that wood is obtained (Barbara bower). F'iire~ 
Haimendori has just completed another field trip to  Wumbu, aimed at documenting the chaqes  
that have occurred since his previous visits, and Sherry Ortner has recently revisited the area to 
study the effects of mountaineering and tourism on the Sherpas' Buddhist belief md  practice. 
Them there is the less formal, but every bit as usdul, on-the-ground experience of various pro- 
gramme staff and, be i t  said, of the Sherpas themselves many of whom are multi-hgual, well- 
educated and extraordinarily well-travelled. In every local context in the Himalayas there is 
knowledge and experience of this type waiting to be tapped. All that is rnissing is the recognition 
by international agencies, organieed science b d  national governments that this ia the level at 
which data becomes information. That is, it b e p  to tell you zmmethmg. 
patterns of applied science, we should make explicit the various steps that are 
involved in this sort of exploratory exercise. 
THE T R A N S  SCIENCE APPROACH TO UNCERTMNTY 
The system that  we wish to describe is, first and foremost, a system for 
generating uncertainty. This uncertainty, we would argue, is not inherent in 
the bio-physical properties of the system (though they, of course, are not 
irrelevant to it), nor is i t  generated just by accident, nor is it generated just 
for its own sake. It is generated by institutions for institutions. The survival 
of an institution rests ultimately upon the credibility i t  can muster for its 
idea of how the world is; for its definition of the  problem; for its claim that its 
version of the real is self-evident. And, for such credibility to be maintained. 
the institution must  come tolerably close to  delivering on the expectations 
that rationally flow from from the system of knowledge that  it promotes.* In 
this way, uncertainties in knowledge about physical processes are brought 
face-to-face with the creation of expectations by social processes. Social insti- 
tutions are  the means by which these two-knowledge and experience-are 
brought together, and only those institutions that  manage to achieve some 
measure of consis'tency in this conflation can remain credible and viable. 
If we have a system of plural institutions- system that  depends for its 
very existence on the contention of the diverse institutions that  comprise it- 
then we should expect i t  to  display a number of fundamental system proper- 
ties: plural perceptions, plural problem definitions, plural expectations, and 
plural rationalities. And for such a system to  go on existing it will, somehow 
or other, have to generate sufficient uncertainty to  swamp all the contradic- 
tions that a re  inherent in the pluralized positions i t  contains. 
To describe such a system you have to  observe it, and herein lies the next 
difficulty. The observer is inevitably a part of the  system he wishes to 
observe; there is no way that  he can step right outside i t  and play the "cosmic 
exile". Our terms of reference and, indeed, the whole context within which the 
institutions we are embedded in were able to  come together to conceive, 
approve and fund this project predisposed us to grant credibility to one partic- 
ular problem definition-that in terms of the trans-boundary properties of the 
silt and water run-offs in the Himalayan region. So we begin by treating this 
particular problem as if i t  is the  real problem but, mindful of all the uncer- 
tainty we have already described. we try to  resist t he  narrow parochialism 
that inevitably closes in around any single-problem definition by all the time 
asking ourselves how this particular dehnition might relate to  some other pos- 
sible. definitions. By doing this we are able t o  list some practical reasons- 
some useful advantages-for choosing as our point of entry this trans- 
boundary problem. Then, as we try to generalize these advantages by placing 
this trans-boundary problem into its political and institutional setting, and by 
conceding that all sorts of other flows (technology "transfers". for instance) 
also encounter boundary problems, we are able to  translate these practical 
advantages into tactical m-d even strategic advantages. 
'"Tolerably close" means that the system of knowledge that ari individual is supplied with in return 
for granting credibility to a particular institution comes closer to delivering on the expectations it 
creates for him than would any of the systems of knowledge that would be available to him if he 
were to switch his elleqiance t o  other institutions. For a fuller treatment of this see Thompson 
1882 (especiaily p. 56). 
In other words, we gradually detach ourselves from a particular set  of 
trans-boundary problems-those involving water and silt flows between the 
countries of the r e g i o n a n d  fasten finally upon trans-boundary problems of a 
much more general kind. Boundaries, we come to  realize, are being generated 
(or actively maintained) all over the place and we end up by focusing on the 
perceptual and transactional boundaries that serve to separate and sustain all 
the various contending institutions. The physical boundaries between the 
nations of the region, of course, fall within this frame but, as our exploration 
has proceeded, so we have found them becoming less and less significant. 
And, as this particular trans-boundary problem has receded, so others have 
come to the fore. If we were to single out one particular type of trans- 
boundary droblem as being the most significant we would choose the problems 
of transfer between national and village-level institutions-between pro- 
gramme provision and programme delivery. 
POINT OF ENTRY: SOME CREDIBLE PROBLEMS 
1. Is the  problem the environmental degradation of the Himalayas? i f  so, we 
must  consider all the vegetated vertical zones-from the alpine pastures 
to the Terai.' 
2. Is the problem the deforestation of the Himalayas? If so, we must con- 
sider the forest zones or, a t  least, those that  are or may be subject to 
deforestation. 
3. Is the  problem the downstream effects-the worsening impacts of flood- 
ing, the silting of dams, the clogging of turbines, etc.? If so, we have only 
t o  consider the increased run-off (from removal of the forest buffering) 
the  increased erosion (from deforestation, over-grazing, over-terracing- 
over-extension of land-use generally) and the increased transport of silt 
(from the combination of these two): 
*These zones are not a t  all clear-cut. They are "merely broad outlines that conform to a basic pro- 
gression of changing temperature and rainfall, and each contains a preponderance of particular 
species that gives it a characteristic identity" (Cronin 1078, pp. 24-25). Botanists dispute the 
specific boundaries and compositicms of these zones but agree that, whatever they are, they do 
vary as  one moves eest or west along the Himalayan chain. Around the middle of this chain, ac- 
cording to Cronin, "there appear to be six zones of plants and animals stacked one on top of the 
other in rapid succemion up the slopes". These zones are: 
1. From 600 feet above ma level (the edge of the plains of India: the Terai) up to 3,000 feet. A 
f rop icd  ZOM, originally largely sd forest. 
2. From 9,000 feet to 6,000 feet. A sub-hopicd zone, originally a mixed forest of Ccrstunopsis  
and &hima trees and the palm Pundanus fircafus. This is now almost entirely replaced 
with terraced cultivation. 
3. From 6,000 feet to 8,500 feet. A lower tsmpemfe zone, comprised of oak and laurel 
forests. Since much cultivation stops at around 6,000 feet, this forest is still quite continu- 
ous. In many areas, though, people largely of Tibetan origin manage t o  cultivate potatoes, 
buckwheat and barley up to  14,000 feet. 
4. From 8,500 feet to 12,000 feet. An upper tempercrte ZOM containing a veriety of forests: 
maples. magnolias, rhododendrons and bamboo. 
5. From 12,000 feet to the upper limit of plant life (varies between 16,000 and 20,000 feet). 
An d p i m  zone. Fir and birch forests giving way to low shrubs, al?ine rneedows and moraine- 
covered slopes. Some cultivation extends into this zone and livestock are often grazed up to 
the very limit of vegetatian. 
6. From the upper limit of the alpine zone to 28,000 feet (the end of the earth). A hrg3 dti- 
tuQ zone. No piant life but many invertebrete creatures feedng on wind-blown plant debris 
(mostly pollen). 
The serious trans-boundary problem is the last one. I t  is, of course, nested 
within the first two wider problems so far as the total physical/biological sys- 
tem is concerned but i t  stands by itself as apolitical problem. 
In one sense, of course, it really does not matter where we start. Whether 
we begin with the tail or the trunk, the systems approach, concerned all the  
time with the connectedness of the' parts, should lead us to the same 
totality--the elephant. But there are, nevertheless, certain practical advan- 
tages in starting with this particular trans-boundary problem. 
1. Being political, it is directly concerned with "the a r t  of t he  possibleo-with 
delineating what, if anything, can be done given the way people and 
nations are now and might be in the immediate future. 
2. It sets for its solution a clearcut and, by comparison with the  other two 
problems, a modest goal--mitigating the downstream effects until they 
become roughly equivalent to what they were some years ago. With t he  
other problems. by contrast, you run the risk of inadvertently commit- 
ting yourself to the immodest and politically unreasonable goal of restor- 
ing the eco-system to what i t  was before man arrived on the  Himalayan 
scene. 
3. I t  places a t  the centre of the whole system the  agent responsible (in the  
physical sense of wielding the axe, that is, not in a social or political 
sense) for the problem--the individual hill farmer. In so doing i t  
encourages us to understand his perceptions, his ecological theories, his 
strategies for coping with environmental dangers, his relations with his 
fellow men and the way in which all these act  so as to shape the options 
that  are open to him and to guide him in his choice between them. 
With this particular focus, the art of the possible becomes concerned with 
two things-the possibility of influencing his situation so that  the  options 
available to him are changed (either by adding new ones or removing old ones 
or both) and the possibility of influencing his choice between these options 
(by, somehow or other, changing their attractiveness relative to one another). 
Such influences can be brought to bear in two ways--by enforcement and by 
incentives. So far as the  ar t  of the possible is concerned, these sticks and car- 
rots are the only instruments there are  for reversing the downward spiral of 
degradation. lf  no combination of these instruments can achieve this then 
there is no solution. If there is no solution then there is no problem. I t  is 
important not to Lose sight of this posssibility; if there is no solution then 
resources, both financial and intellectual, should be redirected towards adapt- 
ing to the inevitable. 
In contrast to this ar t  of the  possible, where policy options have always to  
be measured against the solid (but locally variable) features of the hill farmer, 
there is what might be called the "science of the possible" which simply 
ignores these obstacles. The challenge is, somehow or  other, to explore both 
these-to experience the exhilaration and scope of what could be whilst, a t  the  
same time, gaining some sort of feel for the institutional barriers that  may 
inhibit its attainment. 
The crucial distinction between the "science" and the  "art" is tha t  t he  
first sees the agent (in this case. the hill farmer) as a sort of zombie who just 
sits there having his life altered by the  various ingenious policies that  are  tar-  
getted on him, whilst the second sees him as a responsive strategising being 
who may be expected, not to just passively receive such policies, but to  react  
to them as well. The science of the possible, therefore, has no place for per- 
ceptions, it sees cis-science as the only way to  go. and i t  deals in technical 
fixes. The a r t  of the possible, by contrast, accords a central place to 
perceptions-they are what makes reactivity* poss ib le i t  leans towards trans- 
science, and it anticipates the  institutional obstacles that may get in the way 
of the technical fixes. To understand just the fixes is to risk some nasty 
surprises once you start  to implement them; to understand just the obstacles 
is to risk never getting to the point of implementing anything. The challenge. 
therefore, is not to choose one or the other but to usefully combine these two 
modes of understanding. 
So let us s tar t  with the science of the possible and, ignoring the hill 
farmer and his heterogeneous perceptions, explore the range of solutions that 
are logically possible--solutions, that is. to the trans-boundary problem of 
increased run-off and silt transport from the hills causing increased flooding 
in the plains. But since we already h o w ,  from our  exploration of the uncer- 
tainties surrounding this  problem. that there may not be a causal connection 
between the human activities in the hills and the  flooding in the plains, we 
should include alongside each of these "solutions" a description of how they 
would look for this sceptical perspective. 
Adherence to one or  other of these perspectives is not haphazardly distri- 
buted, nor is it simply a function of personality. The view that  there is a clear, 
causal connection is the  perspective to which those in the plains, close to the' 
sources of power and i ts  articulation, tend to subscribe. Behind it one can 
almost hear the irate administrator complaining about "the debris from 
misused high altitude watersheds" cascading down onto the plains as  a direct 
result of the unruly behaviour of "subsistence farmers on steep slopes in 
remote areas". The view tha t  there is no clear causal connection is the per- 
spective of those whose precarious autonomy a t  the mountainous margin of 
all this power is sustained by the "implicit compact" that guarantees the con- 
tinued existence of the  Himalayan buffer states. Since too much "unruly 
behaviour" in the hills may cause those in the plains to abandon this implicit 
compact and move up to take control of the buffer. the autonomous margin 
has t o  do what it can to manage its relationship with the plains so as to lessen 
the likelihood of this happening. 
Such management--the management of powerlessness-is often achieved 
by strategising behaviour; for instance, that  of the Nepalese ambassador who, 
by lending credibility t o  the existence of a clear causal connection, can 
further justify his claim to increased international aid, and hence autonomy, 
for the  margin. The result of all this strategising behaviour is an apparent 
blurring of the  clear separation of perspectives between those in the plains 
and those in the hills--between centre and margin. The scientific expert, too, 
may find himself drawn into all this; for instance, when he adopts the  position 
of a sceptical observer i n  the  hills and speaks out on behalf of remote villagers 
*Of course, to assume that reaction will be of only one type--that consistent with the notion of 
economic rationality- is really no different (since it admits of no strategic options) from the sim- 
ple zombie assumption. Like the zombie assumption, it too generates surprise-free scenarios. The 
notion of "policy responsiveness" assumes but a single rationality and but a single correct percep 
tion; "reactivity" assumes that rationalities and perceptions are plural. 
But it would be unfair, and untrue, to tar all economists with this single rationality brush. If 
ecanornic rationality is Reen as being context dependent, then one could expect to see different 
strategies emerging in different contexts. h a sense, one could then say that there are as m a y  
rationalitiea as there ore possible strategies. So, rather than making tm indiscriminate attack an 
economists, we should try to mesh our approach with that of the institutional economists who, like 
us, do not ins& that rationality is  extensional. [We have tried to give some indication of how this 
myht be done in Chapter I, in  the section headed Smtagic: &Lordions 2: 39na~t hfarkats and 
Supid,Ifojacfs.] 
who otherwise would have no voice in the policy debate. That, to a consider- 
able extent, is what we are doing here. 
Of course, to speak in terms of just two perspectivesdne from the plains 
and one from the  h i l l s i s  to grossly over-simplify the patterns of socially 
induced perceptions in the region, and the fact that  strategising behaviour 
also has some of the policy actors hopping back and forth between the various 
perceptual vantage points like characters in a Feydou farce only complicates 
things still further. Though these underlying patterns and their overlays of 
strategising behaviour can be sorted out*, we will not attempt to do it here. 
Instead. we will simply try to keep the idea of plural problem definitions alive 
by moving back and forth between just two of these socially induced 
perceptions--the "irate administrator's" and the "sceptical observer's". What 
we are doing, in effect, is taking a crude geo-political slice through all these 
varied perceptions. We identify the axis between the plains and the hills. and 
its accompanying implicit compact, as one of the key variables in the whole 
system and we then collapse all the perceptions down onto that axis and 
explore the range of credible problems and credible solutions through the 
remarkably different perceptions that lie a t  each end of tha t  axis. What fol- 
lows, therefore, is not a complete analysis of problems and solutions but an 
exploratory range-finding exercise. 
SOME CREDIBLE SOL UTIONS 
Solution 1. Restore the run-off (by increasing the tree cover) and restore the 
erosion rate (by reducing the landslides, etc. that  are caused by 
human activity and by increasing the tree cover) so as to reduce 
the violence of the flooding to what i t  was ten, fifteen. thirty or 
whatever years ago. This is an upstream solution. 
The sceptical observer in the hills sees things rather differently. In 
his experience, "the major effects are felt primarily a t  source. We 
don't count them because uplanders don't record the disappear- 
ance of their farms from landslip or burial or chronic deteriora- 
tion". [Rornm 19831. from this perspective, the distinction 
between upstream and downstream cannot be drawn just o n c e a t  
the line that  separates the hills from the plains. Rather, every 
point in the hills is upstream of somewhere and downstream of 
somewhere else. and the distinction is one that  has to  be drawn 
over and over and over again if we are to gain any valid understand- 
ing of what is happening there. This distinction between upstream 
and downstream is crucial because water flows downhill, and the 
critical issue becomes "how to redistribute water consumption" 
[Romm 19831. The problem (in the hills. for the  hills, throughout 
the hills) is that the present pattern of water distribution, when 
combined with the  ethno-ecological knowledge and associated stra- 
tegies of the hill farmers, tends to encourage "extensive land use 
in land scarce conditions" [Rornm 19831. 
There is  no magic solution. Rather, it will be necessary to 
somehow or other encourage a gradual and pervasive shift in pat- 
terns of water distribution so as to steadily move away from 
widespread elctensive land-use towards a patchwork of intensive use 
*For an iliustration of how this can be done in the context of the energy debate in the Wesr see 
Thompson (1082a) and Wildarsky and Tenenbaum (1 88 1) .  
(where landslip hazards are low and other conditions are appropri- 
ate) and detensive use (where landslip hazards are high and other 
conditions render intensive use inappropriate). If there is a causal 
connection between human activity in the hills and flooding in the 
plains then, t h e  sceptical observer would hold, this redistribution 
of water in the hills will do more to lessen that  impact than any- 
thing else. 
The irate administrator's perception leads him towards the 
in tegrated  w a t e r s h e d  management  s o l u t i o n a  solution which 
presupposes that  someone is in a position to do the managing. The 
sceptical observer's perception leads him towards a fac i l i ta ted  
w d e r  red i s t r ibu t ion  s o l u t i o n a  solution which presupposes that  no 
one is in a position to do any managing. The sceptical observer is 
keenly interested in the ecological theories, land-use categories 
and associated risk-handling strategies of the  hill farmers because 
they provide the basis from which facilitation can start.  The irate 
administrator shows little interest in such things and is often 
driven to  distraction by the deviant and irrational behaviour of 
"these people". The irate administrator, you might say, sees the 
hill farmer as par t  of the  problem; the sceptical observer sees him 
as part of the solution. 
Solution 2. Reduce the i m p a c t  of the increased run-off and silt transport to 
match what it was ten, fifteen, thirty years ago (by flood control 
engineering, relocation of settlements, etc.). This is a d o w n s t r e a m  
solut ion.  
The sceptical observer would point out that ,  though he is doubtful 
about there being an  increase in the run-off and silt transport, this 
is probably still a sensible thing to do. I t  is, in fact, the  traditional 
solution in the plains, and all those large-scale public works and 
resettlement schemes are  just what's needed to keep the irate 
administrator happy and to divert his attention from the  punitive 
expedition into the hills that  he has been contemplating. 
A little historical vignette may help to show the way in which the articulation 
of the  political power tha t  resides in the plains and the  implementation of 
downstream solutions go hand-in-hand. Political power needs public works and 
public works need political power: 
The Ganges Canal was the brain-child of Captain Proby Cantley of 
the Bengal Engineers. He was convinced that  it was possible to  get 
water out of the  Ganges and into the Doab, the land between the 
Jumna and the Ganges, ah immense area which suffered from fre- 
quent and terrible famines. He made his first survey in 1836. 
Then came the institutional obstacles--toes being trodden on in the efforts to 
coordinate departments tha t  had not had to be coordinated before, and all the 
exquisite agonies of implementation: 
Every kind of difficulty had to be overcome: orders and coun- 
terorders came from the  authorities, civil and military, in bewild- 
ering confusion. One moment it was to be an irrigation canal, next 
for navigation only. Then i t  was not to be built a t  all; notwithstand- 
ing the  fact tha t  the  East Jumna Canal which had originally been 
built by the Mughals in the eighteenth century had been extremely 
successful in combating famine in the country which i t  passed 
through. 
Then there came the gloomy prognostications of the doomsters of the day: 
I t  was .said that earthquakes would destroy the viaducts, that rnias- 
mas would hang over the irrigated lands, that  malaria would become 
rife and that  the navigation of the Ganges would be affected. (This 
last objection was the only one that proved to  be right.) 
In overcoming all these obstacles the great empire was able to demonstrate 
its power and to impress upon those who were affected by the project the full 
entent of their incorporation into that empire. 
Twelve years after its commencement the Ganges was finally admit- 
ted into the canal a t  Hardwar in April 1854 ... By the eighties i t  had 
been extended as far as Allahabad and the irrigation of the Doab was 
complete. Its completion marked the end of serious famine in the 
area. [This and preceding quotes. Newby 1966. p. 611. 
Solution 3. Some politically and physically optimal combination of Solutions 1 
and 2. This is an upstream and downstream solution. 
The sceptical observer in the hills will probably identify as optimal 
a combination somewhat different from that identified by the irate 
administrator in the plains. But, even so. when the notion of the 
appropriateness of different solutions as we go from downstream to 
upstream-from centre to margin-is fed into this combination, a 
surprising amount of agreement can be reached. 
The sceptical observer, for his part, can approve of the large-scale 
downstream solutions whilst the irate administrator, well aware 
that  the implementation of integrated management schemes is 
much more easily achieved in areas where his control is effective 
than in areas where it is not. may well be relieved to have the hills 
taken off his hands. Provided he can bring himself to accept (and 
justify) that  other, less managed solutions, are  appropriate in the  
areas t o  which his writ will not run, then the  irate administrator 
may well be prepared to let the facilitated solution take precedence 
over his managed solution. Disagreements, of course, will remain 
but a t  least this matching up of institutional obstacles and techni- 
cal fixes allows us to fractionate the issue and to avoid demanding 
an answer to the question "Who is right?". With this debilitating 
demand safely out of the way, the administrator can now become a 
little less irate and the observer a little less sceptical. 
But that is not the  end of it. We still have to consider the unthink- 
able solutions. 
Solution 4. Let i t  collapse. If the  Himalayas are  desertified their population 
will decrease dramatically and human impacts will similarly 
decrease. But, quite apart from the human misery this would 
entail. perhaps the run-off and silt transportation-the non-human 
impac ts-would be even worse than before. 
I t  is not easy for the layman to gain any clear conception of what a 
desertified Himalayas would be like. We could, of course, look a t  
those parts of the Himalayas (like Ladakh, the Karakorum and 
Dolpo) that  are deserts now, but these regions are deserts because 
they lie beyond the reach oi the monsoon. It is the idea of the w e t  
deserf tha t  is so difficult t o  grasp. A first reaction is  that  i t  must 
be a contradiction in terms-an emotional but scientifically 
indefensible outcry against environmental degradation--but, no, 
the north of Scotland, once covered by a rich forest of Scots pine. 
is now a wet desert and in many parts of South East Asia denuded 
hills, their fragile soils leached by the heavy rains, now support lit- 
tle but coarse lalang grass. So wet deserts do exist and it  is possi- 
ble, perhaps inevitable, that  the Himalayas will (in whole or in part) 
become one. 
Neither the  irate administrator nor the sceptical observer con- 
fronts this possibility head-on. Given their prior commitments to  
their respective restorative policies. their eyes are inevitably 
averted from a prospect in which these policies will be rendered 
totally useless. As they urge their various prescriptions they use 
the wet desert as a sort of bogeyman: "lf you persist in disregard- 
ing what we are  telling you, the wet desert will get  you". This is not 
to  say tha t  that  they should change what they are doing; only that. 
like the  Hudson Institute's study of nuclear war and its accompany- 
ing megadeaths and overkills, there is also a need for someone to  
think the unthinkable in the Himalayas. 
Of course, i t  could be argued that  such a study would be a waste of 
time and money because even the most cursory study of what is 
likely to happen if the  Himalayas are  desertified is sufficient to  
convince us that  t o  deliberately allow such a thing to  happen could 
never be a sensible policy. But to take up tha t  position is to 
assume that  the choice is ours. I t  may be, but  what if i t  isn't? 
Solution 5. If the collapse is unavoidable anyway then the  problem is one of 
adapting to the inevitable. What would and could such adaptations 
entail? Exploration of this question will open up some unfamiliar 
and surprising policy options--the development and settlement of 
the new island that  is forming in the  Bay OF Bengal, for instance, 
and the  possibilities of controlling the silt flow through the  Ganges 
delta to  create and stabilise further new land. The deployment of 
capital-intensive projects undergoes a similarly dramatic switch- 
from gulley-plugs in the Siwaliks (the Himalaya foothills) to 
seawalls in the Sunderbans ( the alluvial islands of the delta).* 
Though neither the  sceptical observer in the hills nor the  irate 
administrator in the  plains would wish to concede the  inevitability 
of collapse, both may nevertheless seek to benefit from some of the  
policy options that  a re  opened up by its contemplation. Nepal. for 
instance. has already tried to  establish its claim to this new island 
(on the  grounds that  it  is Nepalese soil) and, if i t  is successful, i t  
might be well-advised to  seek Dutch aid in place of the  Swiss and 
Austrian aid tha t  i t  sees as appropriate now. 
Again, a little historical vignette may give us some Feel for' the awesome 
processes tha t  are at work in the region. 
A Victorian engineer**, Sir Charles Lyell, estimated that 350,000,000 
tons of silt were discharged each year a t  Ghazipur on the Middle 
Ganges. "Nearly the weight of sixty replicas of the  Great Pyramid.  A 
useless comparison. "lt is scarcely possible". he goes on. "to present 
'See, for exarnp!e, 'he very "grand design" soiution along these lines proposed by Fazd (1083). 
**An eminent geologist, in fact. 
any picture to the mind which will convey an adequate conception to 
the mind of the mighty scale of this operation, so tranquilly and 
almost insensibly carried out by the Ganges." Whether some small- 
holder in Bihar, watching his half-acre slipping noisily into the water 
and his family being swept downstream on top of a haystack would 
regard the operation as being either tranquil or insensible is open to  
question. No one knows for certain the depth of the alluvial silt in 
the Delta. [Newby 1966, p. 161 
These sixty pyramids per year have over the millennia created the Delta and. 
if they are to some extent the product of human activity in the Himalayas. 
then that land, far from being a " g i v e n 0 a  part of nature's endowment-is to a 
considerable extent "the flesh and blood and sweat of men" [quoted by Simon 
1981, p. 851. While it has been well said that  God made the Dutch but the  
Dutch made Holland, the trans-boundary properties of this Himalayan system 
give an extra twist to the relationship. God may have made the Bangladeshis 
but the Nepalese (with some help from the forces of gravity) made Bangladesh! 
Solution 6. Even if the collapse is not unavoidable we should still consider vari- 
ous combinations of these adaptive policies with the restorative 
policies of Solutions 1, 2 and 3 above. 
Somewhere, between the undoubted good sense of putting a few 
bamboo stakes into a river bank in Bhutan to prevent a valuable 
rice paddy from being swept away and the undoubted stupidity of 
carting alluvium from Bangladesh back up  into the hills t o  rebuild 
a little terraced field on a ridiculously steep and landslip-prone 
slope, there is a line that can and should be drawn. 
The sociology of perception (which is what we have been relying on to  
guide us as we we have tried to feel our way through all these credible solu- 
tions) whilst it does argue that  problems and solutions are shaped by institu- 
tional forms, does not argue that they can be shaped into anything a t  all. It 
does not  require us to take up a position so relativistic as to  deny the 
existence of the line. No, all of the socially induced perceptions can agree 
that the line can be drawn; their disagreements are over just where i t  should 
be drawn. And the  definition of the problem, the credibility of the solution, 
and the formulation of sensible policies are all directly related to  the  position 
of that line. (If they were not-if, as sometimes happens with some policy 
issues, the noose of certainty was so tight that  such variability and polariza- 
tion was not possible--then the whole issue could be dealt with in terms of cis- 
science and there would be no need for the application of this trans-science 
approach.) 
So this whole exploration of alternative Himalayan realities does fit inside 
some physically imposed frame. Whatever we might argue about the social 
malleability of physical facts we would not wish to  argue tha t  physical facts 
can be whatever we want them to  be. Water, for instance, we concede does 
flow downhill. Or, to avoid any criticism for being over-positivistic, let us  say 
that. if we assume that  it does, we get quite good results; and quite good 
results, not perfect enlightenment, is all we are  seeking. 
PUTTING THESE PROBLEMS AND SOL UTIONS INTO A PHYSICAL FRAME 
Since all these credible problems fit inside a physical frame, it does not 
matter which particular credible problem we use as our point of entry for the 
exploration of that  frame. So we stay with our initial "as if" approach in terms 
of the trans-national boundary transfers of silt and water. 
We have, in the first instance, to take the entire drainage basins of the 
Indus, the Ganges and the Brahamaputra. But, since run-off and catastrophic 
flooding are caused by the monsoon rains, we do not really have to consider 
those parts of the basins that  lie beyond the limits of the monsoon (but could 
the monsoon change? Is it changing?). Nor do we need to bother too much 
about those areas that are above the cultivation limit (approximately 6,500 f t .  
but it  varies with the latitude).* Nor, so far as cause is concerned. do we need 
to bother about the plains. We are left with a long, narrow winding strip all the 
way from Kashmir in the west to the Naga hills in the east. Which countries 
are involved? Pakistan (only marginally?), India, Nepal, Sikkim (currently 
annexed by India). Bhutan (India presently responsible for foreign policy), 
India again ... Burma (has the same problem but does not drain into the  
Brahamaputra--the frontier lies along the watershed). Also, in several places 
(e.g. Sun Kosi and Arun valley in Nepal, north of Sikkim and north of Assarn 
and Arunachal Pradesh in India) China is involved. In some of these areas the  
frontier currently is not clearly defined or is in dispute. 
But what this long narrow strip does not reveal is the convolution of the  
landscape that it contains. Though the cause lies within this strip, it is far 
from evenly distributed along it. The oft-quoted statistic that the volume of 
silt disgorged into the Ganges by the Karnali is equivalent to the annual remo- 
val of a layer of land one and three quarter rnillimetres thick from the  entire 
drainage basin of the Karnali River should not be interpreted as a valid 
description of what is actually happening. ** 
The convolutions of the Himalayan landscape, and its underlying geology. 
render some localities particularly prone to mass wastage and others virtually 
immune.*** And some localities are actually subject to  mass deposition; that's 
where the Kathmandu Valley came from. Far from the  cause being evenly 
spread, ninety percent of the "damage" may result from ten percent of the  
land. Recognition of this profound heterogeneity within the long narrow strip 
helps us to introduce 3 strategic perspective. What is needed is a rejection of 
homogenising generalisations and their replacement by a sensitivity for local 
contexts. On the one hand. we will just be throwing scarce resources away if 
we approach the problem in terms of generalised data and. on the other hand, 
we will simply be wasting our efforts if we persist in packaging land by admin- 
istrative units, map grids. and fence lines. Instead, we must recognize that  
any set  of data is meaningful only in relation to its context and we should 
*But the ideas of an altitude cutsff point is sometimes too simple. See previous footnote on the 
vertical zones, p. 48. 
* q o  haw such a comparison is to mislead and to repeatedly requote it  without any qualification is 
to deliberately mislead. The image of a 1.75 millimetre thick layer of Karnali basin is as unreal a 
picture of what is actually happening es is Sir Charles LyeU's image of sixty great pyramids floatrng 
down the Ganges each year. The difference is that, in Sir Charles' case, the bizarre imagery has 
been d r a m  so as not to mislead the reader. 
**The "denudation rate", the unit used by soil scientists to describe the effects of erosion over a 
wide area, is itself a homogenizing measure which tends to average out the impact of individual 
events such as landslides, but the rate calculated for one drainage basin in Nepal was more than an 
entire order of magnitude greater than the rate generally calculated for that p u t  of the Himalaya 
(Caine and Moo1 1882). In other words, the particular geologic structure of thls area was contribut- 
ing to a far hlgher level of erosion than that generally Lsumed for the larger area. 
allow the data themselves to tell us what are the appropriate ( that  is, mean- 
ingful) land packages. 
So much for the cause; now what about the effects? Where a re  the seri- 
ous (and, perhaps, worsening) floods? The floods occur in India (in the Ganges. 
Brahamaputra and Indus plains), in Bangladesh (fairly widespread throughout 
the delta) and, to a lesser extent, in Pakistan (in the Indus and Punjab river 
plains) and in Xepal (in the Terai). As with the cause, we obtain a fairly 
clearly-defined geographical area for the effect. 
Cause 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of cause and effect. 
This little diagram makes salient a number of key features. 
1. Cause and effect are clearly separated geographically.' 
2. This separation, in several instances, coincides with national frontiers 
and thereby gives rise to the  trans-national properties of the system. 
Moreover, the direction of causation defines "giver" and "receiver" 
nations (e.g. Nepal and Bhutan are givers, Bangladesh is a receiver. India 
is both a giver and a receiver but receives more than i t  gives). 
3. The areas of both cause and effect are densely populated (the area of 
cause perhaps 40 million, the area of effect perhaps 350 million). So the 
problem is first and foremost a people problem; it is a social, economic 
and political problem set  against a dramatic physical backdrop--the 
greatest mountain range in the world. 
*For schematic clarity, they are shown as more separate than they probably are. 
But to state the problem baldly like this is to feed the conventional desire to 
blame everything on population density- homogenising cop-out that we 
should be on our guard against. Just as the mass wastage is not evenly 
skimmed off across the Himalayan foothills, so the effects of population den- 
sity vary dramatically from one locality to another. Population pressure often 
enough does lead to environmental deterioration, but what this long narrow 
strip does not reveal to us is that the best managed lands are often found 
where population densities are also high. We simply cannot draw a direct rela- 
tionship between population and effect across the whole strip because the  
effect of population is totally relative to institutional and technical capacities, 
and these social capacities vary from village to village and from culture to 
culture across the region. So long as technical and institutional capacities 
advance ahead of population there is no problem; eventually we can all be liv- 
ing in space colonies instead of on Himalayan hillsides. The trouble only 
comes when population seriously outstrips technical and institutional capaci- 
ties and this situation, like proneness to mass wastage, is something t ha t  is 
not uniformly present across the region. To identify population density as the  
problem, without developing any feel for the localised variations in institu- 
tional arrangements that  everywhere modify its effect on the land, is to  com- 
pound on the social level the misdirection of effort engendered by homogenis- 
ing assumptions about mass wastage at  the physical level. 
Now, with this physical frame and its heterogenous properties esta- 
blished, we can reverse the  procedure of our earlier exploration (in which we 
simplified the perspectives so as to open up  the variety of problems and solu- 
tions) and move on to explore more fully the ways in which this dramatic phy- 
sical backdrop can be perceived. 
SOME CREDIBLE PERSPECTIVES 
One perception might be that  the problem i s  the collective responsibility 
of the countries that  are physically affected, in which case the  patterns of 
cause and effect--of giver and receiver nations--could provide a first tentative 
framework for the necessary international negotiations between them. But 
such a perception is unrealistically static in that i t  ignores the  grand process 
that has created, and is still transforming, the present state of affairs. 
The forest historian [Tucker 1981.1 will point out that, a t  one time. most of 
the Indian sub-continent was covered in forest and that, over the centuries. 
this forest has been gradually rolled back (under the combined influence of 
population increase. technological development, and political development) 
across the plains and up  into the  foothills. What we are  witnessing now is sim- 
ply the final stage of this awesome historical process. From this dynamic per- 
spective, halting and, to some extent. reversing this trend is an even more for- 
midable task than that  revealed by the more static perspective. In particular, 
preserving and restoring the forests along the Himalayas, without a t  the same 
time doing something similar in the plains, looks like a very artificial and pro- 
c e s s ~a l l y  naive thing to t ry  to do.* 
*Historical processes, of course, seldom do have "final atages". What looks like a final w e  often 
turns out to be simply a turning point. In North America and in Europe the forests, after being 
rolled back for centuries are now actually rolling forward. The point we wish to make is that a feel 
for ths historical momentum is  crucial for anyone who is trying to  hasten t h s  turning point (if it 
exists) in the b a l a y a n  region. 
Another virtue of placing the problem within its historical context is that  
it provides us with some guidance on the critical uncertainty as to whether 
the forested land in the system now is being treated as a renewable resource 
or as a convertible resource (in much the same way as the waters of the 
Ganges were converted by public works into a means for the extension of polit- 
ical influence). Clearly, the  whole rolling-back process depends upon the 
forests being treated as a convertible resource. Only in the case of the little 
pockets that  remain is there any likelihood of renewable resource treatment. 
If what is happening in the Himalayas now is essentially the continuation of 
this rolling-back process, then this would suggest that  much of the forested 
land is being treated as a convertible resource but, at  the same time, the phy- 
sical contortion and the political marginality of the region should result in 
many more (and larger) pockets of renewable resource being left behind than 
has been the  case in the plains. 
The strategic implications of this historical insight are profound. The 
rolling-back process imposes a complex pattern of heterogeneity--renewability 
here, convertibility t h e r e a n  the Himalayan forests. In the pockets, all the 
institutions will be geared towards renewal and will only need sufficient 
encouragement and support for their forests to remain intact. Ekewhere, all 
the institutions will be geared towards conversion and will first of all have to 
be "turned round" for conservation to become feasible. 
From a wider international perspective, the idea that the problem is the  
concern only of the directly affected countries is similarly naive. The 
Himalayas, for better or for worse, exert a powerful fascination over people 
and organisations many thousands of miles from the Indian sub-continent. At 
the level of the global community, the Himalayas enjoy (or suffer) a status 
that is little short of a de f a c t o  International Park  The English garden is 
largely composed of Himalayan plants originally collected by Sir Joseph 
Hooker; Nanga Parbat is a German mountain, K2 an American mountain, 
Annapurna a French mountain, Everest a British (and New Zealand) moun- 
tain*; there are Californian monks in Tibetan monasteries in Kathmandu. 
Spanish nuns in Lahouli nunneries in Kulu, and world travellers of every 
nationality, colour, and creed spaced out all the way along the trails from 
Pokhara t o  Muktinath and from Lama Sangu to Everest Base Camp. The 
Himalayas are  to this modern Grand Tour what Italy was to its eighteenth cen- 
tury counterpart. 
One exercise that  might be worth taking seriously, as a way of exploring 
the wider international pressures that  bear upon the region, would be to t rea t  
the Himalayas as an International Park and to enquire, first, into what sorts of 
park management techniques would be appropriate in different institutional- 
ized settings within the developed world and, second, into how those tech- 
niques (and the recipient) might fare when they are  transplanted from the 
centre out  into what is really the margin of the periphery of the global 
economic system. It is ironic that, whilst those individuals who embark upon 
this Grand Tour do so in the hope of putting a little distance between them- 
selves and the  elaborate institutional arrangements (especially the bureau- 
cratic ones) of their  highly developed home countries. those who are responsi- 
ble for the delivery of international and;national government aid programmes 
are drawn almost exclusively from those irksome institutional reaches. In 
*Not, re hagten to add, in any colonial sense but in the sense that these nations' relationships 
with, and understendings of, the region are to a considerable extent aha~ed through their historic 
involvements with these mountains. 
consequence, the exploration of these various transplants may well reveal 
more about the institutional disjunctions within the highly developed North 
than about the cultural gulf that separates it from the less developed South. 
If it does, then that  is all to  the good; aid can then flow one way and self- 
understanding the other. 
In the nineteenth century the Alps became "the playground of EuropeH*, 
and it is this idea that has shaped them into the sporting, convalescing and 
recreational paradise (nightmare) that  they are today. In America. the idea of 
"the wilderness" so dominates the  National Park scene as to make the Alps 
look like Disneyland-with-Snow. So stern is this ideal that. not only 
telepheriques and sumptuous mountain huts, but even the presence of natives 
in the landscape is frowned upon.** In the lavishly illustrated Time-Life book 
?he Himdayas, [Nicolson and the editors of Time-Life Books 19751 there is  not 
a single Himalayan inhabitant of the  species H. sapiens to be seen.*** In Bri- 
tain the absence of wilderness and the presence of Wordsworth has led to  a 
park ideal in which the  appearance of man's interaction with nature is frozen 
a t  just the point where "all is peace, rusticity, and happy poverty, in its 
neatest and most becoming attire". [Gray's Journal in the Lakes quoted by 
Wordsworth 1810, p. 70.1 
In t.he projects, the proposals, and the prescriptions currently aimed a t  
the Himalayas all these park ideals can be discerned and, since their com- 
bined impact is likely to be considerable, an understanding of the various con- 
tending aesthetic orientations that  underlie international concern for the 
Himalayas may well prove to be a useful evaluative aid. 
A TENTATIVE SYNTHESIS 
Possible problems and possible solutions do not meet up with one another 
in some value-free void;**** they come together only when there exists a pos- 
sible perspective for them to  come together in. Then, and only then, can 
appropriate and socially viable management styles emerge. Such possible per- 
spectives are  socially-shaped. value-impregnated, and aesthetically- 
articulated Surprising though i t  may seem, i t  is aesthetics and not econom- 
ics, or engineering. or applied science, or systems 'analysis, tha t  has to be 
accorded the central role in formulating an approach to the problems of the 
Himalayas. It is writers, painters and poets who profoundly change the world; 
economists, engineers. scientists, system analysts a n d  be it said, interna- 
tional agencies, just tinker with it.***** Rather than succumbing to the t e m p  
tation to see ourselves as the saviours of the Himalayas, we should heed Lord 
Keynes' salutory advice and aim to  be "like dentists". [Keynes 19311. 
*We might refer the reader to the book of that title by Lesley Stevens and also to Thomas Uann's 
& M a g i c  hwrhin and to the film Thc Sund OJ Music as the supports and evidence for this par- 
ticular park ideal. 
**Thoreauls Wddun, John Yuir's whole life (but see his & Childhood Md Youth) and, in particular, 
his friendship with Theodore Roosevelt are sufficient to give some impression of the strength of 
this park ideal. 
***This i s  not puitr correct. There are some tiny specks to be seen wdldng up the Western Cwm of 
Everest in a photograph wrongly captioned " h a p  urna". 
****Or "garbage can", to use the organisation theory terminol y. 
*****For an elaboration on this perhaps disconcerting theme s SR Bouiding (1983). 
Aesthetics, of course, is to the artists what ornithology is to the birds but, 
even so, i t  can help us to tinker in a more effective way. Parks, like other 
social and cultural institutions, have followed a developmental path. We have 
had private parks, municipal parks, national parks, bi-national parks* and now, 
for the first time, we have in the  Himalayas a de facto international park. 
since the same aesthetic forces that  have shaped the parks we already have 
are, even now, busy shaping the parks we are about to get, there is much to be 
said for trying to understand these forces-the different perspectives within 
which possible problems and possible solutions can come together, and the 
different park management styles that can emerge from these conflations. 
The aesthetic of the  playground shapes the Euro-park; the aesthetic of 
the wilderness shapes the New World park; the aesthetic of man-and-nature- 
in-rustic-harmony shapes the British park. All three aesthetics (and, perhaps, 
others as well--the Japanese park?) are currently competing to shape the 
Himalayan park. We should enquire whether these competing aesthetics are 
inherently contradictory. If they are, then it is a waste of time trying to 
create a single management style out of them, and the solution is to  frac- 
tionate the Himalayas (along the lines of the pattern in terms of renewable 
and convertible resources) and to  encourage the application of the appropri- 
ate aesthetic and management style to each fraction-the wilderness style in 
the parts that  are (or could feasibly become) sparsely populated (Hongu, for 
instance). the playground style in the areas (like Khumbu) that have already 
evolved in that direction, and the man-and-nature-in-rustic-harmony style in 
those more densely populated areas where man's impact is greatest. 
If, on the other hand, the rival aesthetics are not entirely contradictory 
then. to the extent that they are not, i t  may be possible to negotiate (or, more 
properly, facilitate) between them wi th  a view to moving towards a new syn- 
thetic aesthetic appropriate to  the Himalayas. Or, rather, since the 
Himalayas themselves are far from homogeneous, towards a number of dis- 
tinct aesthetics-one (or more) appropriate to  the Indian Himalaya, one 
appropriate to the Nepal Himalaya, ... one appropriate to the Bhutan Himalaya. 
Such negotiations, of course, are  already being attempted-in the  social 
forest/commercial forest distinction highlighted by the Chipko Movement in 
India [Agarwal 1982, Gadgil and Sharma 1982, Tucker 19811, in the experimen- 
tal efforts to establish National Parks in Nepal,** and in the careful prepara- 
tions for the development of tourism in Bhutan [Jest and Stein 19821. 
The tentative conclusions that  can be drawn from these negotiations sug- 
gest that  there is little prospect for achieving any viable synthesis of these 
aesthetics. In its early attempts a t  establishing National Parks, Nepal would 
seem to have fallen foul of these contradictory park ideals by choosing (under 
external aid pressure, no doubt) one that  was inappropriate. In many cases, it 
can be argued, the British ideal of man-and-nature-in-rustic-harmony would 
have been more appropriate than the American (and New Zealand) wilderness 
ideal that  was initially chosen. 
"National parks can be recommended only if the rights of the local 
inhabitants can be safeguarded. A totally misguided proposal to eva- 
cuate the Sherpa inhabitants from a Khumbu National Park has for- 
tunately been abandoned. But the tragedy of the Rara National Park 
must be a warning to  planners prepared to  sacrifice human needs to  
*For example, between the US and Canada. 
**Nepal hna already parcelled out development zones to different national aid mimiom ao & to 
avoid conflictm between their different, and perhaps irreconcilable, approaches. 
the establishment of wild life sanctuaries. 
On the banks of Rara Lake there used to be two medium sized Thakuri and 
Chetri settlements, which greatly contributed to  the  attractiveness of the 
locality. Neither had encroached on the surrounding forests, and the cul- 
tivation of crops of barley and potatoes utilized only a small area. The 
lake was full of fish which the local people caught only by spearing. Such 
was the position in the early 1970s. When a Wild Life Sanctuary was esta- 
blished, the inhabitants of the two villages, who had Lived there for many 
generations, were forcibly evacuated, and moved from an environment 
situated a t  10,000 feet above sea level to the lowlands of the Terai without 
being provided with adequate aid for their resettlement. it is reliably 
reported that the communities disintegrated and many perished within a 
short span of time." [Fiirer-Haimendorf 19831 
INTERNATIONAL MD AND INADVERTENT CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 
The first thing to notice about these various park management styles is 
that  they all involve management, not facilitation. A s  such they are antitheti- 
cal to a political margin that  has to sustain its precarious autonomy by play- 
ing off against one another (in the nicest possible way. you understand) the] 
various external pressures that  bear upon it. As Long as it is successful in 
doing this i t  will keep itself largely free from hierarchical patterns of control. 
Of course, there is some control in the margin, and i t  .is hierarchically organ- 
ised, but it is remarkably undeveloped. A comparative study [Schloss 19831 of 
Russian, American, Chinese. British and Indian road construction projects in 
Nepal shows that, though each country adopted a distinctly different manage- 
ment style, they all encountered serious and unexpected diEiculties in match- 
ing their styles to a situation where the machinery for administrative and 
financial management and control scarcely existed. 
Their surprise is rather like that  of the British colonial powers who, hav- 
ing chosen the principle of indirect rule as the best means of extending and 
consolidating their empire, found themselves up against some peoples in West 
Africa and the Sudan who simply did not have any c h i e f s a n y  permanent posi- 
tions of leadership--through which that indirect rule might be channelled*. 
There are two ways of coping with such a surprise: keep the external style and 
change the indigenous organisation, or keep the indigenous organisation and 
change the  external style. The first way leads to cultural imperialism; the  
second way leads to appropriate institutional development. 
If we assume that imperial aggrandisement is not the aim of those who 
provide this aid, then what we are  faced w i t h  is a facilitation problem on a glo- 
bal scale. At the macro level an international park Looks like a good idea but, 
as i t  moves from this provider level down to the delivery level, i t  s tarts  run- 
ning into difficulties. The challenge is to resist t he  temptation to  push it 
through regardless (a temptation that, alas, i t  is particularly difficult for the 
bureaucrat to  resist) so as t o  allow a learning process to  move up in the  
reverse direction and modify the initial design to suit the local conditions. 
A successful buffer draws a sharp distinction between itself and what Lies 
outside it. Though governments in the Himalayas can do very little to directly 
control their hill farmers, they can (and do) exercise considerable direct 
*These are the celebrated acephalous societies. See. for example, Bohannan and Bohannan (1960). 
control over their foreign tourists (and other visitors). They issue them with 
visas, they count them in and out, they grant or withold trekking permits for 
various areas, they add and remove mountains from the list of available peaks, 
they insist on trekkers taking kerosene or gas fuel with them in the Everest 
region, and they demand that  adequate insurance be taken out on the lives of 
high altitude porters engaged for mountaineering expeditions (they also exer- 
cise much the same sort of control over research and aid projects). There 
are, of course. certain constraints on their freedom to channel this alien 
influx--to irrigate their land with tourists. Just as water will only flow 
downhill, so tourists (with a few notable exceptions--the Chitwan Game 
Reserve in the Terai, for instance, and river rafting) will only flow uphill. 
towards the mountains that are the object of their pilgrimage. Tourists are 
also very localised, culturally and spatially. They all want their four-minute 
breakfast eggs and they all want to go to the honeypots of Leh, Kashmir, Kath- 
mandu. Annapurna and Everest, and in consequence. the very considerable 
sums of money that they spend are not a t  all evenly spread throughout the vil- 
lages.* 
But, even so. by closing to tourist traffic this airstrip here and opening up 
that airstrip there, by stipulating that if you fly into the Everest region you 
must walk back (or vice versa), by granting or witholding trekking permits for 
different areas ... by initiating or discontinuing tourist buses along different 
roads, those who manage the powerlessness of the buffer are able to gain con- 
siderable scope to ease the tourist flow this way and that. In so doing they 
modify the social contexts, and hence the strategic behaviour, of remote vil- 
lagers whose lives they are scarcely able to touch by any direct means (and it 
is, of course, an excess of direct control that is inimical to the inner worbngs 
of the buffer). 
So the sharp distinction between the inside and the outside of the buffer 
is the key to the successful modification of the park management styles as 
they make the transition from the provider to the delivery level. By frac- 
tionating the issue, so that direct control is exercised over the alien tourist 
and only indirect control over the indigenous hill farmer, the buffer is able to 
have the best of both worlds. The tourists, as  they are carefully channelled to 
the places where they are needed, can enjoy all the blessings of an Interna- 
tional Park whilst the hill farmers, pretty well immune from any such con- 
trols. can get on with their lives in what is for them a working and lived-in 
landscape. Just as, to the Sherpa, mountaineering is simply another kind of 
trading so, to the hill farmer. the International Park can be simply another 
way of making some of his natural resources more valuable to him. 
*And, of courae, much of it never reaches the villages but stays in Kathmandu and even California. 
Quantification and science are often bracketed together, and it is indeed 
true that  they are often in one another's company, but quantification is not a 
necessary condition for science. This is just as well because, if it was, we 
could not develop any scientific approach to uncertainty, apart from that  
which aims to convert i t  into certainty or into risk-an approach that, a t  
present, is making little headway in the Himalayas. But fortunately science 
proceeds. first and foremost. by reducing the arbitrariness of description and 
this is what we have tried to do in getting to grips with uncertainty. 
The Himalayas, we can safely say, abound in heterogeneity. There is the  
ecological heterogeneity that  results in perhaps ninety percent of "the prob- 
lem" being caused by perhaps ten percent of the land; there is the social and 
cultural heterogeneity that,  by endowing or witholding technical and institu- 
tional capacity, dramatically modifies the environmental effect of population; 
there is the resource treatment heterogeneity that  transforms the raw 
material of the forest into a patchwork of renewable and convertible 
resources; there is the  aesthetic heterogeneity generated by the social and 
political forces that  shape the various contradictory park ideals; there is the  
geo-political heterogeneity that results in such markedly different control 
modes as  we go from the  inside to the outside of the  buffer. In recognising 
this heterogeneity, in uncovering the patterns in which i t  is arranged, and in 
identifying the  processes that  lie behind those patterns, we can discard all 
that conceptual baggage that  assumes homogeneity. We are left with remark- 
ably little; a description in terms of linked patterns a t  three levels (physical, 
social and cognitive) and of the institutional forces that  sustain and transform 
those patterns, and a strategy for intervention based on a limited number of 
management styles and their appropriateness in relation to the heterogeneity 
that  is revealed by tha t  description. Though we may sometimes despair a t  the  
inability of our institutions to cope with the complexities of our world, there 
remains the simple fact that, like it or not, those institutions a re  all that  we 
have. Rather than despair we should make the most of them. 
A CLOSER LOOKAT" THE PROBLGM' 
The wide uncertainties that  currently exist at the biophysical level- 
uncertainty as to whether the consumption of fuelwood exceeds or is comfort- 
ably within the rate of production, uncertainty as to whether deforestation is a 
widespread or localized phenomenon, uncertainty as to whether i t  is popula- 
tion pressures or  inappropriate institutional arrangements that  lie behind 
instances of mismanagement of renewable resources ... uncertainty as to 
whether deforestation in the hills (if i t  indeed exists) has any serious impact 
on the  flooding in the plains-mean that a wide range of mutually contradic- 
,tory problems are  credible. The Nepalese ambassador to the United States, for 
instance, is convinced that  there is widespread deforestation in the hills and 
that there is also a strong connection between i t  and the flooding in the plains 
whilst Charles Houston, for his part, is convinced that the forests of Khumbu 
are in as good shape now as they were twenty years ago. These positions. 
given their policy implications, are inevitably thrown into contention. One 
position justifies one policy, the other position another policy, and the stage is 
all se t  for the acrimonious exchange of accusations of self-interest. If, by 
remedying what is happening in a nation of 14 million souls, the welfare of 350 
million more can be assdred then. of course, resources should be committed 
to the  small'root of the  huge problem. But, i f  the forests are not really disap- 
pearing then who, we should ask, stands to gain by convincing us that they 
are? The whole international eco-lobby, of course-the professional foresters, 
conservationists, agronomists, and so on who need serious (but curable) 
environmental problems every bit as badly as anti-poverty campaigners need 
poor (but deserving) clients. 
The perhaps unpalatable point we wish to make (and it is the point on 
which the whole trans-science approach rests) is that,  if we wish to retain any 
shred of scientific integrity, we must extend legitimacy to each and every 
problem definition that  can be formulated in such a way that all i ts a s sump  
tions lie within the current bounds of uncertainty. To demand to know which 
of these problems is the' right one is simply to encourage the arbitrary 
tyranny of one uncertain position over all the others, and we do not wish to be 
a party to that sort of thing. On the other hand. if the price of keeping an 
open mind on the subject is the acceptance of a world view so cynical that  it 
can see behind these rival positions nothing other than the ill-disguised and 
predatory advancement of craven self-interest, tha t  too is a pretty unattrac- 
tive option. So is i t  a straight choice between Arbitrary Tyranny and Cynical 
Resignation? 
No. We can, as they say in international negotiation, fractionate the  
issue; we can separate current certainty from current uncertainty and handle 
each by its appropriate mode. We can visualise the boundary between cer- 
tainty and uncertainty moving this way and that  in response to two opposing 
forces--the drive towards certainty that advances under the banner "what are  
the facts?" and the  drive towards uncertainty that  is  the inevitable by-product 
of people variously choosing, from among available (but contradictory) facts, 
those that comport best with their various socially induced predilections. 
Only those who subscribe t o  the sociological fallacy, and believe that  the 
universe can be anything they want i t  to be, could seriously consider a situa- 
tion in which this boundary was pushed so far out that  nothing was certain; 
only those imbued with the positivistic optimism of Victorian science could 
trust in the foreseeable arrival of the day when all uncertainty will finally be 
squeezed out of our environment. Not wishing to  position ourselves a t  either 
of these polar extremes. we began by conceding that  in any policy debate 
uncertainty will always be contained within a noose of certainty and that  two 
complementary modes are available for the progress of that  debate: we can 
strive to tighten the noose and we can strive to  understand the forces that  
resist that  tightening. The first is the adversary  m o d e ,  familiar t o  us in such 
grand institutions as the courts of law and the scientific method,* in which we 
ask "what are the facts?"; the second is the ezplorutory  mode ,  less familiar to  
us perhaps but subtly built into most constitutions and into many political 
systems, in which we ask (in effect) "what would you like the facts to be?" The 
first, when successfully applied, allows us to  get rid of what we cannot live 
with; the  second, when successfully applied, allows us  t o  live with what we can- 
not get rid of. 
When we apply this sort of fractionating approach to the policy debate 
over Himalayan deforestation we see that the nome of certainty is, a t  present, 
rather loose and that, since there are many importmlt variables (like local 
fuelwood consumption rates) that (unlike oil and gas reserves) are intrinsi- 
cally measurable, there is clearly much progress to be made by the pursuit of 
the adversary mode (especially if data are not torn from their contexts). At 
the same time, the scientist who operates within this mode soon becomes 
aware of all sorts of institutionally mediated pressures (from the granting and 
*But not in science itself which is complex mix of adversary and exploratory modes. 
withholding of resources by the agencies that fund his research, through the 
screening processes built into the editorial policies of the journals in which he 
aspires to publish, to the systematically biased responses of the villagers he 
interviews in order to assemble his data). The institutions, you might say, 
have got there ahead of the scientist and have interposed themselves between 
him and the facts he is so anxious to uncover. Thus, there is a very real sense 
in which the institutions are the facts. 
SO WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
The first part of the problem (and perhaps the  most difficult part to 
grasp) is that there is not a problem. There is a plurality of contradictory and 
contending problemseach one focused by the  shared credibility it enjoys in 
the eyes of those who subscribe to it, and each held separate from the rest by 
the mutual incredibility that is the inevitable global corollary of locally 
focused credibilities. The reason, of course, is that if the institutions are plur- 
alized so too will the facts that  those institutions mediate be pluralized 
'I... it is a common characteristic of interactive problem solving that  
many, perhaps most, of the participants each carry a distinct version 
of what "the problem" is in their minds ... They are not working on 
any one given problem, nor do they think they are." [Lindblom 19821 
The second part of the problem is to accept this state of affairs; to  stop 
demanding a problem when there is not a problem, and to take up a concep  
tual position from which diversity, contention, and contradiction, far from 
being undesirable qualities that must be eradicated before any progress can 
be made, can be seen for what they really are--our ultimate resource. 
THE OUTLlNE OFA STRATEGY 
I t  is not a n  either/or choice between cis-science and trans-science- 
between the adversary and exploratory modes. Both are essential. The choice 
lies in their appropriateness in any given situation. At present, in the policy 
debate surrounding Himalayan deforestation, there is clearly much scope for 
both modes but, a t  the same time, the  rich institutional plurality (and, in par- 
ticular, the  institutional "spread" between the micro- and macro-social levels 
that is the inevitable accompaniment of the "many agents" problem) suggests 
that the biggest payoff will come from the exploratory mode. 
So what does the exploratory mode look like? F i t  and foremost, it is 
tolerant of contradiction. not  in a spirit of anything-goes eclecticism, but with 
a view to  uncovering patterns of contradiction and contention (such as those 
that are generated through local credibility and global incredibility). I t  
uncovers those patterns, not for their own sake, but for the  policy capabilities 
that may be embedded in the dynamical systems that  sustain them (within 
the "cautious cultivator" and "adventurous trader" strategies, for instance, 
that provide the dynamic basis for the widespread Hindu-Buddhist geographi- 
cal and cultural pattern). Then the exploratory mode has to turn away from 
the sort of legitimacy-conferring and legitimacy-withdrawing processes that  
are appropriate to the adversary mode. Learning, mediating, facilitating, ... 
interacting--these are the  sorts of processes that  characterize the exploratory 
mode. 
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APPENDIX k 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A DISCUSSlON 
PAPER BY IIASA ON INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CASE OF THE HIMALAYAN FOOTHILLS 
The purpose of the Discussion Paper, to be prepared by IIASA a t  the 
request of UNEP, is to provide a basis for developing a consensus among the 
various UN agencies actively engaged in the geographic area, on the nature of 
the problem and a range of policy options and action programs to address the 
problem. Following a review, discussion and consensus among the UN agen- 
cies involved. UNEP may use the revised document as a basis for discussions 
with Nepal, India and Bhutan, as well as with other national and international 
agencies who may be potential participants in formulating future remedial 
Action Plans. In this sense, the document is seen as providing the strategic 
orientation for specific future action. 
The proposed Discussion Paper is to: 
(1) Collect easily available, and a t  macro level, critical information to under- 
stand and address the issue and to identify serious gaps in information. 
(2) Provide a broad overview of the current status of the problem in terms of 
the interrelationship between biophysical and social environments. 
(3) Describe the issue a t  the macro level and "bound the problem area. 
(4) Identify, by employing a systems approach, linkages between principal 
actors and processes, social, economic and ecological impacts. 
(5) Present the information as a dynamic interacting system. 
(6) Propose, tentatively, the actions and realistic policies that  can be under- 
taken. 
- locally 
- within a country 
- multinationally. 
( 7 )  Include a list of agencies involved, sources and types of information avail- 
able (e.g. UNEP's INFOTERN UNESCO's MAB. FAO's Forestry Projects, UN 
University's work on land degradation, IUCN's conservation strategy, 
etc.). The participants a t  the July 15, 1982 meeting held in Geneva 
offered their full collaboration and agreed t o  send macro level informa- 
tion on the issue, (e.g. review papers, state-of-the-art documents, problem 
analyses, etc.) to UNEP (Golubev) and IIASh and to all other organisations 
represented a t  the meeting. 
(8) IIASA will undertake this study by hiring a suitable person to  gather the  
background information and by setting up a small Advisory/Working 
Group of key experts in the area. Michael Thompson has overall responsi- 
bility For the preparation of the Discussion Paper. 
(9) considering that  the objective of the report is to  enable UNEP to  formu- 
late recommendations for a meeting in February/March 1983 and the 
resulting time constraints, IIASA will keep UNEP fully informed and will 
provide the salient findings of the Advisoryflorking Group by 24 
December 1982. 
15 September 1902 
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University of London 
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ContributiorxSocial and cultural properties of the problem area  and 
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Dr. Jeff Romm 
School of Forestry 
University of Caifornia, Berkeley 
&LCkground: Social forestry projects with Ford Foundation in 
India, forestry experience in Nepal, Southeast Asia 
Contribution: Applied development experience in forest sector of 
the region. 
Dr. Malcolm Ode11 
Local Institutions Specialist. Synergy International, 
Consultants in Development. Amesbury, Massachusetts 
Bhckground: Sociology, facilitation experience in development 
projects in Nepal, Botswana. India 
contribution: Advocacy of indigenous institution management 
techniques in the problem area. 
Dr. Leo Rose 
Department of Political Science 
University of California, Berkeley 
atrckground: Political Science 
Contribution: Comprehensive background in the geopolitics of 
the problem area, Nepal!in particular. 
Dr. Brian Arthur 
Food Research Center 
Stanford University 
Background: Institutional Economic Demography, Operations Research 
Contribufion: Population trends within the problem area, their 
relationship to both the  physical and the social and cultural environments, 
and their responsiveness to  conceivable policy instruments. 
Dr. Aaron Wildavsky 
Survey Research Center and Department of Political Science 
University of California, Berkeley 
Background: Political Science, Policy Analysis 
Contribution: The constraints on the implementation of 
conceivable policies within the problem area. 
Dr. Jack Ives 
President International Mountain Society 
Department of Geography 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
Backg70und: Geomorphology, glaciology, administrative organisation of 
International Mountain Society. coordinator of research in the problem area 
of United Nations University and UNESCO sponsored projects. 
Contribution: Mountain geoecology, connections with research 
community presently working in the region. 
Dr. Jagmohan Maini 
Director General 
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Corporate Planning Group 
Environment Canada 
Background: Ecology 
Conlribution: Environmental management styles in different 
institutional settings. 
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Background: Natural Resource Management 
Contribution: International agencies and their 
impacts on t he  problem area. 
